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1OF T^IK r!T
The fxndh.n^:s of the Tnternational "ilitarv Tribunal concerning the
yrar ag^-inst the United Statos are as follc-'/s (Vol, p, 21^, of the EIT
Uecisi:.n:
'tTour clays after the attack launched the
Japanese on the United. States fleet in Pearl Harbor
on 7 December I9I4.I5 Gernany declared •'i'/ar on the
United States.
'T}ie Tripartite Pact bcb/een GorTnany^ Italy, and
Japan, had been signed on 27 September I9U0, and
from that date until the attack'upon the U.S.S.R.
the defendant von Ribbsntrop, vdth otlier defendants,
V7?.s endeavoring to inchice Japan to attack Uritish
possessions in the Far East/ This, it vas tliouaht,
^^:ould hasten Bhglandis defeat, and keep the United
Statos out of the uar.
"The possibility of a direct attack on the United
Sts.tcc '70.S considered and discussed as a matter
• for the future, _1ajor von Fallcenstein, the
Luft.nfie liaison officer with the Operations
Sta.ff of the Olf^, sivriarizing military problems
which needed disc^issicn in Berlin in October of
19i;0, spoke of the possibility/ 'of the prose
cution of the v/ar against inorica at a later
date.' It is clear, too, that the German policy
of keeping ilmerica ovit of tlie 7/ar, if possible,
did not prevent Genaany mromisin-- supmort to
Japan even against the United States/ On h
April 19ltl HitlGr told. Hatsuoka, tie Japanese
Foreign inistcr, in the pres:^nce of the Defend
ant Von Ribbentrop, tliat Germany wcild 'strike
v.ithout delay' if a Jap,mes0 attack on Singanore
1 , should load to 700.1- bot7.7cen Japan and tho United
States^. The next d.ay Von Ribbentrorj himself
4 urged iateuoka to bring Japan into the v.'p,r.
^ 28 November IPU'I, 10 days before the a ttack •
on iearl Harbor, Von Ribbentrop encouraged Japan
throaigh her^ inbassadcr in Berlin, to attack
Groat Britain and the United Statos, end stated
that shou3.d Japan become eng-agod in a r/ar 7;ith
the U^tod States, Germany v/ould join the war
li.imecdately, i few days later, Japanese
representatives tcld. .Germany and Italy thatJapan was preparing to attack the United States,
and aske for their su-gjcrt, Germany and Italy
afTced to cTo this, although in the Tripartite
"Ct, Italy and Germany had undertaken to assist
Japan only if she were attr.ckod. 'Uien the
assault on Rearl Harbor did take place, the
Dofenaant /on Ribbontrop is reported to have been
ovwrjoyod , and later, at a ceremony In Berlin,
when a Gon.ian modal was a.vardod to Oshima, thc
•-panesq ^mibass-ador. Hitler inJicatocI his approval
^ /? tactics which tic Japahose had adopted of
nego x ..ting with tho United States as long as
i '^ossible, and. tion" striking hard v;5.thout any
doea.a-rs.tion of w-.r^ •
-I-
iU-though it is true that FUtlor and his collearues
originall^^ did not consider that a war ulth the
Uiiited vStetes would he beneficial to their
interest^ it is apparent that in tlie course of
19bl that v/as rovisodj a:id Janan was given
every encoua'aganient to adopt a policy which
'aould alnost certainly bring the United Sto-tes
into the v;ar. And when Japan attacked -the United
States fleet in Pearl Marbor a,nd thus nade
agrrcssive war against tlie United States, the
Nazi Govcrruaent caused Gerinany to enter the war
at once on the side of Japan by doclaring war
tlicnsGlvcs on the United States< "
d
'(• •
I
> --
\ • • • -A-'ia
'V • s.
+ •
b/'i' •-.r
'••-V
^ vb'»AVj
• . ' V . '
f ^
' • i ' . i.-'-'t • -.r ;
.. yt
. I"
);•
Iw dh. ^
,' '• •
•VF
. -I-
V''
• '' •/1
i
I
•' -v . • •
^2^
.M
Wl''
jy
\ .l l.i
•t'.
• "•
"• ' b'y
l':.- .. •yn*''!
•,i •'
b 'lib''
•'•VA
• v.; dW'. W
• .ah/b'W
.'i ' .1' ' I^ - f ,
••••. V ^ &]!
« M'/, . • O
to
.'U f'\
• •, X Aj'vd'hKa
^ ;bv':W v
>• ,i 'f-; '.1 .b'
1
A2. SCOFS OF IKS BRISF
These findj.ngs of tJic Intcrnaticnal Ti'ihuiir.!. tiave been
f-ully supported and supplcvAcntcd by the documents uhich have como to
/ light in "the "Uvo years since that judgment v:as hp-nded dovm. "•"niile
• originally, Germany did not consider that a war with the United States
would bo beneficial to her interests, the documentary evidence shov.s that
in the course of 19Ul that \m-ev; was revised and Japan was urged and
- urged 3-gain to join the war on the Axis side, and to attack in the East
Germany's onemios the British and the Netherlands, and also the United
States*
The documenta.ry cvidcnca "Which *wc "^.'ill refer to in the folloV'Ting
chapters, will prove the follcTang:
1, Tliat tlio defendant ''nelSSAECKSR witia the assistance of the
defendant '^ '.''OESUiVNN used his power and diplomatic machinery
to push Japan into the war. For "this purpose ho used "b.'/o
channels:
a*) Japanese rcprescntatLvos in Berlin^ cspociallp''' "Uae
/ iimbassador Oshima., who "v'/as recentl;/ sentenced to
life Impriscmcnt for his participation in this
very oct of aggression.
' b.) thnough his, •R'EIZSASCIfER's, subordinate, friend, and
defense witness, the German Ambassador in Toylco—
Eugene Ott. ^
2. That the defendxint f.'EIZSA^ZCIlSR. v;i"th the assistance of "the
defenddnt'••pERIIAIJN used "nis power and diplomatic machinery
to prevent by all means a. pee.CGful settleriient between the
United States and Japan, as at"bemp"bed especially during tlie
simmier and autuian of 19ltl-
-3-
iniiiiMi'L'iin-1-; "i iitfkwillill'wl" I
3, '.'.nSIZSAIiKISR'S AD-3;SSI0N IN OHDN COURT
In his direct exainination RlilZSASGISR adnittcd in substance tint he
pcTticipatod in pushing Japan into the Yrar bocausG he v/CvS afraid 'tiiat
she night othorr.dsc reorganize and re-Griont her trend. ' UIZS/iRCIvCR
asked in direct oxanination:
'Q, Therefore^ it ivas your opinion tliat if the
United States helped the Russians and the British
short of Y/ar^ in that case Japan vras to do tijc
sano in favor of Gemany and Italy?
A, I v/ouldn't like to sa.y tiiat Japan ivculd do idle
sariiOj but I v/ould like to say that Japan should do
the sane. I express such opinion by virtue of the
special reason that Japanese policy in 19Ul iv-as not
one that vrc could clear1;^ understand or connrchend.
Sonetines I ':/a.s inc3.incd to believe that instead of
contemplating increasing aid, Japan v;ould suddenly
reorganize and reorient its trend and v/culd go over
to our enemies, at least, iiapassivcly. " (Underlining
supplied) (Tr» p. 7906)
T.'EIZSARCICER, of co^irsc^ in coiTilcto line Yvith the Nazi foreign
policy strategy of projecting the blame for their avm crimes to the
/
victims, as shcim in tiio case of the Dutch, the Scandinavians, the i-'cles,
and tlic JcY/s, this time pointed a finger at alleged unfriendly acts
against the •peaceful-minded Germany on the part cf the U.S. He v/as
asked, in direct examnation by defense counsel
Before taking recess you mentioned, ivitness, »-
that it was the aim of your policy in "the connection
last discussed -that German^/ should not at least
initiate unfrionddy acts,' Did such unfriendly acts
occur .around this time?
A, Yes, they did. There T/erc such acts of un-
fi-iendlincss, Dot mo name to you the delivery of
fifty torpedo }ioat destroyers to Dritian on the
part of the USA: later on the occupation cf Green
land -and at 1 later phase the so-called shooting
ordor .against German boats, in short, those measures
'Wore called h-ieasures short of war'." (Tr. ?• 790$)
However ho foj-got to state before the Tribunal, that such alleged
unfriond].y cicts v/erc ti'ic result of his ovm agr-Tossivc policy which
started as far ba.ck as 1937- It is typical for his state of mind that
still considered it as an unfriendly act for an^^ nation
to propoSG hinr^Lranco to tho T;iird Hoichhs aggressive course, "".HIZ-
S;i.T!lC:CCH T^as so eager in defending tio promotion of tho Japanoso attack
against the British and the United States that he caran forcot for the
•'n't
•m
3tdjic liis other defense liiio;thc.t he had to participato in Nazi crimos in
order tc ccvor ut) his secret rosistanco aiiris.
I
. •I . •
"•I
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h. T^TIiXair OF SUGSIE OTT
After these arlnitte.ncos of ".XllZS.V^CinJh in his cUroct cxoxdnation,
not too muc}i requires to be scAA r.hcut the •vr.rious GX"_:lanc!.tions ho -
advanced in rc particularsj in tlio sGconclar;- lino of his starf-ored
dpfonso. Thus, ho vfantccT to have it established throurji his defense ^
v.dtnoss tiie Nazi Ambassador Ott in Tokyo, that he, "'XUZSiAOCiraA, did
not yarticipato in pronotinp;' a Jap.ancso -entry into the r/ar through the
channols of his German Ambassador Ott in Tokyo, However, this vdefonsc
atternpt was a complete failure'when Ott was shovm a document (Pros. lux.
380, NG-[tl;[;8, Doc. Dk, 9) which was taken from'"FIZSiiDCIGTds oTm files
and. which he had oven distributed tc "OrPJXD!;, who ha"V initialled it
and to Ritucr, who had initialled it. This docu.mont, a cable from
rdbbentrop to Ott of February 27, 19Ul reads as follows?
'Use all available means tc induce Japan to take
possession of Sinpapcrc by a surprise blov? as soon
as possible," (dJ:da.ibit 3OO, HG-iiiiliO, Doc, Dk, 9 D)
Ott was asked in cros.5-Gxa.minaticn, rnd this one question sufficed
to domonstratc the attitude of this ivitnoss who himself v;as a co-
conspirator arpainst the peace,
Then I 7/ant to ask you: Do you recall that
in February 19Ul, yc\'. received a secret telcara.m
from Ribbentrop in which you wore told tie follow
ing—and- tliis was directed to you personally—I ask
you witi all means at ycair *lispcsal tc v/ork toward
the end that Japon should capture Singapore as soon
as possible. Do 3-ou recall that tologro.n?
A, Yes, I rcnombor that instruction,
Q, Thank you. That is all." (Tr, p. IOI8O)
In addition the prosQcutLen established through tho cross-examination
of this witness that ho was not acquainted with tho work of the pclicy-
makinp arencios in Berlin, svich as encompassed in the participation of
'•.•BlZSiACCm and in promoting tho Japanese attack against tho
U.S. or Britian.
;'pp :• a ,,-.6-
V dv). L .m T •
\ I , ' •' i lb^ '•* '
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5. AFFm.VIT OF TH3 SIIGIS'L-JII OF ST:iT^ GYmGT, J.t^JlSrULL
Another defense attonnt ivc.s the introduction of tlic copy of an
affidavit cp-von on I-Iarch 10, hy General Georoo C. Marshall, Sec
retary of Shate of ttio United States, in connection vrith tho Tokyo
•Arr Ori^^cs Trial CTeizsaGckor Docuinent Book 7^ p. 19) • The defense
souaht to establish throu::;h this affidavit that there had not been
ccGi-dinaticn bot.rcon the xixis partners in the Japanese attack,
Tnis is, ho"ivcvor, not the issue in the case at bar, Tlic Prosecution
charges that '."MIZSjAXKMR, together Y/ith other defendants of tlic Foreign
Office, prcrLO tod Japen's entry into the war against the British end the
U,S.,which charge has nothing to do v.'ith the efficicncj'' cr the dogyoo
of cocporation in tlie field of riilitary operations, . ,
Socrcta.ry of State Mo.rshall in this carefully prepared affidavit
for the Tokyo trial add-Tosscs Ms statononts to nilitary and strategic
prcpo.rations -and not to foreign policy activities.
-7-
\6. TlSTH'.Oiri 0? i^AVY CAPT'vIH EJ-JSJUI2"iG3M R^.II'HIGK^
In r.dr'lticn tho •sros^cuticn has esta-rlishGcl iiiG fact, not so clearly
knoYm before tliis trial, that tho Gcraian" Navy "jas vGr3'- nuch concerned
about tho coordination cf her CT/n and the Japanese plans as r/e will
show in this brief. Through the testimony of the formBfr '^ German Chief
cf Operations of tho Naval surface craft in the Naval High Command,
Na\y Gn,ptain Hansjuorgon Roinicke (Tr, p, 31901 ot scq) and his
affidavit (Cx. hOO). In the following pertinent parts of Reinike*s
testimony tJie underscoring is sup lied#
i^ii> ifctfrilirt
___ Testdiiionv- of _HaV5r Operational Chipf
l_-ans4iierg_en
^31 DP, KPIHIP:
O. Please give pomr full name.
A. ] V full na..ie is Hansjuergen peinicke, .
•Q, liiere are you living at present?
A. I sum living at Dremen^ Timiaersloher Landstrasse 12.
Q. Uovj old are. you?
A. I ain 45 and three-quarters.
Q. Hot; long vrere you in the Geriiian Navy?
A. '/el3-j about a quarter of a century.
Q. 'fliat T/as your last rani:?
A. Full captain. ' >{
Q, \7iiat kind of comiand did you have at the end?
A. I V7as coi^u-ianding officer of the heav '^" cruiser^ Prinz
nu. ,en.
Q, That is the ship you broa;.,ht to the United -States
later?
A. Tes, it had to be de.livered to the -States.
Q. .'Jhat are you doing at present?
A. I ain employed by ia3-itary Government Bremen as Civil
ConsuH.tant of the Transport Division.
Q. Is.that a3-l?
A. And besides that I am Vice President of, the Breiaen
Civil Port Authority.
'3. Before you becaixie Captain of that famous ship, you
had sOi-ae i::iportant duties in connection 'o'ith naval operations.
tiTnat .were they?
A. Yes, I was responsible for the operations of the
Kuval surface craft at Berlin in the Naval High Gomiiisnd.
Q. Con you ;.jive the Court soj-ie details about your position?
A. I was there from 193b to 1941, Jmd iiiy responsibility
vvas "to p3.an operations of surface craft.
Q. In the Atlantic or Pacific?
-9-
A. Fe?.]., ire coiO.dii't send thaa in the ?o.ciric_, onl '^" in the
Iiorth Sea ^nd tho Atlantic.
0, I see. As a person responsible for planning ilaval opera-
oions in such an ii.iportant Izey position did j '^ou hiaice your plans Td-tliin
the frar.ie'TOrk of and synchronized i/ith bhe war policy eiLecated by '
other agencies? • "
A. :F0ll, naturallv aj 1 oAceratipns had_^bo be tiaed '»Jith Uie
pp?.iticp.l_and_fjGn8rj^_ v/ar situation.
Q. Pioin:j. -Sictiyities betv/een 193b_ and
you. constantly" advised by your_sa,.-^eriprs _and_ypp^^^ liaison oificep _
vith other agencies .about the futipre r/ar plans?
C], D;^d you participa'te in such conferences •:here these future
war plan^ of the Navy irere discussed?
A. Yes^ 1 did,
Q. A few weeks ago you signed an affidavit, did you not?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. b"as tills affidavit correct?
A. it was.
Q, 'Fere ohe contents of this affidavit part of your official
knowledge in y-our capacity as a high Naval officiaJ-?
A. Yes, they were iiiy personal opinions based and formed by
ray official laio" ;ledr*.e.
Q, -Jhat kind of invasions did you have advcjice IcnO'dedge of.^
for instance?
A. For instanco, IFor^/ayr-peiiaar::, France.
0. Ho^f raany aiontiis in advance?
A. That depended. SonetiLies it v/as tv/o or three laonths, some-
tildes onD-y a siiort notice.
Q. Did you ever _iiear in..Y^^.^. .9^?>PA§-\_°AF.%city about plap.s
to__ push Ja,a^_ .ifl't'D the ;./ar?__
A. . Yesj^ X_ did._ _
Tnen did you he_ar about these plans f irst? _
A. Duriiig 19iil*
A. I askj uo push Japan into the -var a^'ainst .Jritain, against
the United ooates, pi;;'against Russia^., pr against pll >hree?
4, I thiii-C agaiiist the enejrl3_s .^id pp^sntial pnei.Lies pf._
Geri.ianv.
0, Are •''•"ou includin|_^. the Nnitpd..'llja_tes pf__.-w.prica?_
A. 'Tsll^, tiiey had to be yepl^ned as_^p6pt©Hti^^^^
that, tilde.
-10- •
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S'../.—— I r liiir'iiTTiiii-ii.'-li'Tiiii rin. t'' niiii i r' iijiiifri '•MMi '• n i I'i'i
•' "'' W'
VPyi tP-f^-\ other a^^nciss
•p/.Ap-p1\p^p.'pp pLv4v-'j:*..-AAAA.P--P -
A.hP.^.A'I P,3.iA£". '" '^^ ^>"1.
--* J-^rrA?- X A°'Ap"5t PSPP. PPJ-2PP '^f}pPP Ai .^tout — I thinl: it
•—- -r^v-J-A?A^>.P lipP: PAiP-PP-^PAP^ there yias soneItpss2,_bi3,ity..pf S^\_3-2A®PAPA-^pAJ'iAPA-'^ A^„UnA<®'i Ja^-:an.
•i' aAPPP 2PPiAA '^'P_Ar',p^]A^ 1-°^. A^.4aAJAA.P .Ajl P^ this idea?
"• i AAP Apd^P.s^tpn_tiiat they.Ai^A
0. in those operationaJ. conferences you attended, -.vhat naies
of x-oreiA Office officials were naiiied mostly'" as coordinatinci this
planning ".Jith the rvav '^' '. farfare?
A. fas names Jiiostli^^ niGntioned to me by the liaison officer to
the Foreign Office and by the Cliief of 3taff of the Ilaval High
Comiiiand, v;ere the names of Secretary of State von ttlZS.tA'AA
.\i'abassador lUfilU,. " "~ "
Hou -often v;ere these noj-ies mentioned to you in this connec
tion? Can 2^oli give any fi ures or data?
.1. i^o, it's not i>ossible to figures but any tii.ic a poli
tical. subject popped up.
Q. .ias tliis aJjnost every daj'?
A. Oenera-lly in a staff meeting soiipthihg abouu these affairs
v/as mentioned, and so the names a'ere j.ientioned.
D?u. k-ddlfjA: Thanh you, that's al3.. The ydtness is yours.
✓
P.imJIDml-;:- JuDC-m I..XvUin.s Dr, Becker,
In cros3-e;:aj'iiii..-.tion Ueinecke i-iaintained and 'mctonded his testi- ;
i:Dny to defense.
020S6 IX . liJ .T.COK
•wY Dii, (For .oizsaeclcer)
"itness, did you ever neet llerr von I'elzsaecker personally?
I v;as never introduced to lilia.
Did he ever attend anj'" of the conferences 2''ou have ].;entioned
A.
here?
Ko.
P. Then in your .affidavit you said that you do not doubt, that
Stats. Secretary von h'Gizsaecker too v/as v/orking to the same effect
in order to persuade the Japanese to enter the war. -u-.th this state-
i.ient d.o you iiean to say that ilorr von "feizsaeckor Icnev/ of plans of
tiUs kind, or do youhaean that he hiiuself worked to bring about
tills end?
A. I •••c-'na Ciiat a idgh official in tlio position of ouate secre—
of
hat
if he had not done so he presuijiablj'- vrould not have remained State
Secretary.
,t. j, uiiav ALgn ificia. he osic-uuxi ux uau.'-^
tai" '^ i/on -1i2-at this stage of the war viust, as a i-iabter
course, have been tryin.g to get an aD-3-y onto GeraaJiy's side arid t
-11-
•/ i*f
1'i, 3o it's a conclasion yoa are dra-.an^^ not a concre-oe Icnow-
1q(^^o of his activity?
i. Concrete icnov/lodge only insofar as trn-oach the official ^
Imo-.iledc.s 1 obtajjied. froiii Captain Kranzfsldey X-..on :jcfor-.ied that be't-
T/oen the Foreign Office e.nd Japan there nas contlnaous contact^on
the snbjoct -.vith the aim of Letting Japan inuo the -;;ar on oar side. ^
I .lyself nev-:.r sa '^ these docu-.ents.; it n-asn't usualj bat Xv;as tola
aboat theia.
If 1 luiderstood you rightly_, it is in the main tnrough
Captain aXc ju'-feJ-der tiiat you heard about' the varaous activities of
Foreign Office?
A- 1 had other sources too, Firstlpp these stelf conferences
7jith pi^i.irel Fr:c-:e iiiain3-y at tiiis'tii'-Oj and ehen liaison to tne
Ke-.\ Gema-nd of the ,.r<'ied F.-rces ".ihere'I ""./as aJ.so informed about
the I'tain guiding principles of the politica.7 leadv^rsiiip*
?.riSXDIi;G JUDGh ^j.GUr.CC; Just a moment^ Doctor, \ie ^dH talce
just a moment's recess.
(liecess nas talcen)
P_Li31Di:X-- JUDGjJ :X.GUIHOi • hv. v:ill rion- resurae.
Q- (By Dr. Bechor) lay I sa~miari2o the last matter once again to
^ meicc it clear? iin'ough"Herr ICranafcldor you heard and ^.so through
the other channels ^/ou just men'i^ionedj you heard that in une .'orej.j"jn
Office -jork nas being done to this end and for^tho^ rest you concluded
•' . that a -laii in the position of horr von Xi . 'i^ct natura™Lv
have been ^.'orking to this end?
A.
Q. Ven;- v/e3.1. 1!07/, a fui-thcr question, 'i.e. , ct:.vi-oy of the
Foreign Office of nhich you heard through those cnanncls, you^thought
referred to oJ-l potential enaiiios as you said just no^.g tna'c isj,
as vou said just no,kn,r,lend, Ilussi.^pund the U.S.n. are you not
a-.varo that at tliis very tiiue there iras a current, in Germany uhich
-/as trying to get Japan mito the v;ar ag^misa Russxa but -oo prevent a
Japanese-.buerican v-rar?
A. That v/as at_the_bp^^iining__of 19yid. i as_f^ r_,:.s I re_^
'• ih - gAe eaid.y 3j2i''ing or tne y_ear that thc_ attitude
the U-JA v/as brouglit
Do grou icno'.: ^Aio held tliis opinion in the Foreign Office or
is this just the gsneral iiipression you roceived from the Naval
Coiiu.iand meetings? . _ . . . , „ .r „
A. lift is the gonoral opjjiion i ooLainod fron the Naval
Co/i,iand mocbin'S aifd from blie reports of horr .u-aazfelder. .
Q. PAit do vou icnow any dotails about the attitude of the
varuous individull mombors of the Foreman Office on this point?
A-on^jhrn^h ong that therejms_t^l °P.,j°®i.bi£n_to _bhis_stand-
oeint.
-la-
I '1 Uit• »J^iJe^
Q. any rate in order to surirdarize, you yoarseJ-C did
not have an^' direct contact v/ith Herr von '."Gizsaockar about these
questions?
A. Noj I occasionaJ.ly saw the jtate oecretary in the building
but 1 had no personal contact with hLu,
The witness was than asked by defense'of kittor about Patter's
rolo in this schaue, IIo'^ i^Gver the prosecution docs not maintain
its charge againot Patter in tliis particul..r aggressive act.
Pw.DiPaOT .lit .niinoi-J
Bf :dl.. K.iJ?iL:P;
Q. Did '^•ou ever hear through alJ. these conferences and as a
result of 2''ou.r officia.1 laiowledge tliat the defendants "r'jI'ZS.bllCiuJP
or Rittor in private or other conversations vdiich coiae to your
Icnowledgo -.jero opposed or iiiade any iuove an opposition to this idea
of pushing Japan into the v;ar against Russia^ Britain and the
United States»
A. No, I didn't hear about tiiat, but I csm't confirm the
difference beti'/een Russia and the United States v/hich you just
mentioned. I said before that at least frojiL late Spring or early
Suiimer of 19/!l- it didnH make any difference whether .Uaerica v/ould
be brought into the war, or not.
.J.* ICMPIfmP,: Thank you. That is a-11.
JUDGd PO.r.lli: Just a minute. Could you tell us the exiiibit
nuuuber of this affidavit?
^3. hdlPkmR; l+OOy your Honor.
JUDGd :i.^GUx.U; I irould like to clear one inattcr up with the
•dtness.
31 JUDdi IdGULL"-
Q. As I undcrsbood you to say^ j^uibassador Ratter, •v/as not
present at any of the staff conferences of the I-Ii^hi Gomjnand?
A. That is right.
Q. But v/as he present at any conferences betv/een Commander
Kranzfelder aiid yourself?
A. No.
G, So far as you Icnow than your affidavit in that respect
is mistaicen?
A. Yes.
Q» And he never conferred i/ith you or vdth'-
A. I haVo given the v/rong iiapression-, yes> I am ver2'^ sori '^"
about it.
Q. Taat is quite all right, just so v/e got it •cleared up,
«13-
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'"g 7;ant to understand this. Now going into this laattor of the desire
to have Japan enter the warj I understand that the first natter of
iiinortance and desire on the part of,the Arned Forces and of the
Foreign Office v/as to get Japan to enter the war against Russia, ^
fhat 7/as the priiiiary and earliest plan or desire?
A, Yesj thaV s right.
Q. ilnd D.ater that that changed and it v/as the desire to get
Japan into the war so as to divert British Naval strength.
A. xind the stream of .luierican 7/ar material from the jJu2?op<-;an
theatre of war and from the Atlantic theatre of war.
Q. Yos. 'JcU.j ifas it 2"our thought and the thought of the I^igh
Command that if an attack was made by Japan upon'Great Britain in
the Hast that thereby .imcrican "jar material './ou^.d be diverted from
the Atlantic over to the Far Hast?
A. I can pnly_givo Jj5.1.?orson£a vier/, ^d thp_t__;.7a3_that the
Unit_cd_^^dtate^ Britain__and so that an
attack _of Japan £n_Orpp.t_Bp;ita^'pan jblie Eapt would bring_;^erica
T n'i'.n "h-ho "-Jn Y> crNAnrtr* rsv> 1 i-i-nvi »into_the_p(ar_soonGr pi^_lator_,
Q• ^.':^^ji^2.^_a_iaatper of dispu^ssion?
A, Yesy it ..'as,
th
Q. o^her__officor^s of_
3 High Coniiaand?
A. Yes_,_it waj3,_
It_v7as_thon_ i'P'£hed_upon as__an ^ovitable non_30cuen_ce_that
attackGd_Cp;eat_3ritain_5n the Hast_the United,State8_;>7ould_bG _
brought mito^tlio -far? " ""
A, t_7;as j.ip •
. Q. Now was t-hpre ^iscus_sion_at any of theso_ conferences
.t'O iiaying_the_first_attack madejDv Japan be aj^ainst the_
United States? ~ " ~
A. No_j_ No_^ iO{a3___aot_our _concern_j_
Q," lour_ji"^an poncern was t_o_^get_J^an_into the war,_
Q. Yes, to got an ally.
JUDGH iiAGUIRH;. I tliink that is clear, as far as I am concerned.
.-R. K-Al'NifJls I-ia^" I ask just one additiona-1 question and clear
the aiattcr of the affidavit up?
JUDGH iHiGUmd-;: Go right ahead,
HCDII^HCT HX.d:iIivTION (Continued)
BY CR, OPNHR:
i Hf^.'^ wX®topd_it wa_s not your__conpern "•diether_dhey wonJ-d atjbaplq
^^S,cppre_j_ .•i.-cnila^^^or what_not, Tore such theatres^l^Hce liinila,,,
i2iB:Sf;P£^G £r_such 2laco_s .-ientio"nod?
y '''
••'y-,...'/-Yv
lUtaKii'iii •• • ••
-in-
'k:-s5;,
A. Oh_2_ naturally.
Q. The _x5.y.li2pinosj^
A. ?As^_eiid _British sources^ of f^^l.i 3orneo_j_
Q. I see. So__, -'Utc_h_^ Britisl'^ -
"..'ero iiiontioned?
A. Yes»
1 ^
• • •"-.. !\ . /I (••:•...-irR ••!••"',
••a, 1.. JiiaAW
'• -c.
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GERIiri.l^''S Ki:> DIVIDING THE ^'DRLD
A, Tgstir.iony of Dr. Frioclrich Gaus
The gran-0. strategy of promoting the Japanese to attack in the East
has boon rloscribei by one of the most competent observers- of tho German
cliplonatic nachinory for war, the vdtness Dr, Friodrich Gaus (Pros. Ex.
378, Doc. Dk, U556, Doc. Bk. 9)s Hiis piece of evidence bears out the
correctness of the findings of "Uio International Military Tribunal.
Furthermore, it is in full correlaticn with the documents in evi-dence
an-l Ydth the testimony of the Chief' of the Naval Surface Operations,
Admiral Reinike.
•"'bile defense did not try to attack in open court tho credibility of
prosecution vdtness Reinike, TJEIZS/iECKER^s former Navy colleague, they
attempted to attack the credibility of Friedrich Gaus. Of course, they
did not attack his testimonjr before the Internaticnal ?-tLlitary Tribunal,
v;here he oppcarod as defense 7/itnoss for Rudolf Hess and made important
statenonts about the German-Russian pact of 1939 which are now a matter
of history, d'EIZS.xECI<ERis defense also did not "Uilhlc it vise to atta.ck
the Gaus aftldo-vit given in this trial for the defense of Hitter, The
defense v/as also not able to stiow one single document which could have in
criminated this T/vitncss, even in the slightest degree, in the terrible
charges here brought against 'nsiZSiiECICER and F/OEuS!'!/!!®, of participating
N
/
in the murder of six million Jgv;s»
Ihey wanted to make this Tribunal believe that the tostinony of
Gaus, "r-FIIZSAECIGilRts former collearuG of tho Foreign Office, v/as given
under some kin' of psychological pressure. Ihis attempt failed completely
bbcausG the idtness Gaus, when faced with unsigned excerpts of an
interrogation held about one year before, denied categorically "that the
testimony givc^n before this Court and in his affidavit (Pros, Ex, 378>
NG-U556, Doc. Dk. 9) was given under any pressure and stated most
emphatically that he had never been subjected to pressure. Moreover, he
testified voluntarily in open-court for several hours .and the defense
did not challenge any particulars of his affidavit.
The Gaus affidavit is set forth as follows: (Exh,378, NG-/i.556, Doc.
Bk. 9).
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TTLj'ISLi'.TIOi: OF DOCmU^IT NG~U556
CIVICS OF CHIBF OF COmSEL FOF *;7Jl CkE.!^
Exhibit 37^
A F F I D A V I T
'Ij Dr. FriGclrich Gr.us, in tiic ycnr 19Ul Finistcrinl. Director r.nA
Chief of the Le^el Division of tlie Gernan Fcroirn Office^ v/ith the title
ef- an Unr^or State Secretary, horeT/itli nnder cath, after havinri been
instructoi that I noko nyself liable to punishment thrcur^h a false
stato-ment, declare the follcTdna; of ny cvm free r/ill and without duress
or threat:
l) Throurh ny personal obsorvati::ns, thrcuch the Icnowlodac of
secret cTocumonts cf Iho Foreign Office, especially of memoranda on .
diplomatic conferences of Plitler o.nd. Fdbbentrop, and also through
personal statements of the Minister, the final objectives of the
fcrGii:;n policy of the Third. Reich as thoy were pursued at the hiah
pcirit of its a£;,"rossivG actions.in the year 191^, bocoriG known to ne as
f ollov/s:
2) The Gcrma.n political leadership saw in the Japanese attack
on'Pearl Harbor on 7 Dcceoiber' 19Ul the first step toward the realization
of the idea of founding a Great Germanic Empire. For this Empire v/as
intended not only to rule Suropo, but to be the decisive f.actor in
the stocrinr^ cf world events in their entirety.
3) The Japanese entry into the war had a long prior history in the
files of the Foreign Office, that is comprised of many dipl'^natic actions.
h) Tlio trianr-ular coalition Borlin-Rome-Tolcyo, ^ibbontrop had tried
to esto.blish fimiy an Idea for world policy as early as 1936 through .
his Anti-Gc-mintcrn Pact, ?jn \ th...n above all through the Tripartite
Pact of Autumn 191+0. '""ith the Jo.p.ancso attack "in the Far East the
German foreign policy dotormined n-ow to approach the farther ^.caching
objective of dostroyinr forever the-British world empire. At the same
time it was inbondod tliat the United States should thcre'r;''receive a
position o.f second rank, excluded from the horitare of the British world
empire and h<5r (the U.S.) sphere of pm'/er and influence limited to the ,
norihern ]:art of the American Ccntincnt. The prograia of the Gcnaan
Foreign policy provided furtlicr a division of the spheres of interest in
the Eastern Hcrisphero bofe'eon Germany and Japan, Accordingl;/", tlie
demarcation should-run along t3ie lino from the Urals, the Persian Gulf
and through the InHan Oco^an east.vards of Africa. The discussion cf
the details v/ont so far that consideration was even devoted, for example,
to the .fixing of the demarcation line in the area cf Jiadagascar. Ccn-
cerning the role of the ibds partner Italy,. German diplomacj?" did not
give itself much worry, for th.is role ivould of itself bo limited to "the
•proper size throufja the ratio of pcv/or between Gemany and Italy.
/ 5) This dividing up of -the vforld was n-o more daydream, but the plan
of action that German di'plooiacy intended to transfer into.reality
immediately through the 'final victory'.
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6) At first Cior. fortji^a policy' had trxsd after l>f9j
dLiraa., ta: braf -'iriod of {xsnia^r'''s fra ..v.Si.;.": -x.tli tlis ooviot
iG-Uf-ii f'ssia lui ib.o reafa.ac.tlon of tlas pcaa of 'joraa-va_ciii GO
Tfd-j scope, i.a tlio occasion of tlio vacit of tlio Aasoiaa Foroapi jfni'S-
tcr ; o.".oto"7 :ji d'Oriiai :ai r-ovciuber .V/-V"^ tlvc ob~ccciv3 - /as pursued
•r.'.tli ff- oiicr-f-' on tl:e part of tlio Crcixuns qf cfr...rt:n,:, Russia fro-.i
acute .juro_.3-n pro',.''.3...s^ of direct_ii;_, its poiacp to a scrutlr./ai'a
ac-.vanuo "..n.sG v.io .'jL'UGi'.s-i .jiirD-i.rc aiiGi o*ii-'.s -ic.''-'•-1.;, Uu jj-.irG..Cj_pa^
as ic •.."as vorbcfsauci^ '"lui tlio lucuidacion of ilic ro.-^uns of tlio
..'rXoi-jii ,u—-.arc,'' f.ir.s cian o-<ca -o.,0-irou. ii • ,cc-.Sj.on xor g.io ^-iGGac—
a-^o.iuist cliO oovxot Unxon obooiote. It mst cf.so bo consr.dorod t*iat
tlio pl.ui of 3.0x.iui_i,; in Inf.'.nd liad bad 'go jo abandoned. LiicoT.'Xso
tlio atto...;t to "Oil S.ain "go ...a-..o an o.tt.cob on l.ibral'Gar aiic. cut
laii J.md off froiu gIio l..^dil.orra-iGan brcxl faf-od.
7) .but tlio Tl.xrd Roxcli sa; itself -xn the duiuior of 19-;i at
tiib poal: of its poncr. Wo'a the plan of dra'-'xnp cP... c,:i cuico tno ivar
on tliv5 s:.do of oho fi'is _.x> ;n'3 c.ore fulf.p :uito "gIio foro^pround of
the policp tliat iibbeiiGrop u'as purstiiiip -jith rr.s cl-plonatxc .-aachi-
norp". flivj; (roii-icji forof n "oolin"" 'Glicrc"-t.i p.lc.;. od out Glio lust poli-
ticc.?. tm.-ip c-urd^ to iv... the doat.i blo".; go 'g.i:. ..'rxGisa jj.--xpdro
tnrou. h the Jao^ncS'^ o.ttac.b b.^c-.unot Suiic-.apOiG and India.
C) m doin;^ this the forofpi policy'-, and -.dtliout
cone iriij i:iclad.-.d in its cf-culations "gIio '.'ur ' v.th "g.io unc-tod --jta.tGs^
boc.-.uso gIio i.iGricrii capacities for supportraij liritam '.lorG appraised
as an LUii-;portant "issuo for tlio ivar., and it '.,"as planned to clii-duiato
then PGntiro.''.v tl.rou_;,h the. cnticipatod rc.pid victorp ovoi- the 13r_tisii
9) 'flit Roich Forci ui l.in:-ster Riobentrop in 19'-y. ro:p-rdod tlie
final foal^ as so dxiin .ntlp ap/roachinu that ho In^isolf^ as lio -uan;'"
tiiies stated in conversation •ith no and •.dtli otlurs,, 'ras vocied
•,ith "Gho fol.lo:.^in., str-.npe norrv; "gIiw •.•orld do..fnatinp position of
G-ornonp' '.oaj-d in gIio fuGure be so stron*^ and su.ircno that there nou.ld
then be no further foreipn pol'.ic;'' in the old sense, llonco tlioro
;;oiLPd be for a forei.^n i.uuiister no iioro roo.d for prea.t diplo.:..atic
doQds aahdh- "'orf.d rn consequence be pushed aside 03" Hitler as an
unnoodod ff uror Ri.bbentroi) expressed the concern tli.-t Hitler ivoald
in the future have liis 3Gol.icj;'" in llasliinaiton and Tot^'o represented
bv .-iilitarr -in.
10;; as GOunc._:-iip
fro.1 aJ.l d;._lo.,i:-gic fore-3 for eho sntrp of Ja...-an in'oo Gho
mr iid acc-OGGiii , m 'GUvj oa.r ^ain t*ieroe3"' one ""..'ar ntn Gno Umtod
btat-es as a ler-eu.iabl^- cheap pr.ice. 'J^ior-oa "^orld-.rido x-iport las ix)
be piven to Ga.
^rsonal concern did not dotor Rr.bbontrop
'P-oiuun action one. iio ^Dosition of the, ru.l >r of horld
eolic3" 3e..:ired go Ger-aiq-^ for aj.l tdie. x^or tins reason Ribben'tpop
'-^G tli.'.t t_.:e desccibodj both in pr-vcte co.ivers"tioas and also .in
d•.'clomGic conferei'.cc5_) Gae oapcuiese a.Gtaeic oa roan, i.aroor as g—e
iCiOst i>.norG?,nt sveat of the '.varj an evj3.it that openo^ up •nrdd-'ids
3Cerspec Gives.
-I
" •*' ' .Hit. O 'I I•
.'il l in
I; hr.ve c^ircfully up c.n affidavit coraprisinr; t.TO papos in
the Gerraan lanmiape, and liavo rcvicv/ed thi s H-nplish translaticn there
of, an:l personally sipned it. I iierc\/ith declare under oath tho.t I
have made this statement to the best of my kncT/ledro and consciencG
corres-ocn-linr:': to the full truth.'
^h.l0^nl•>erf5 January 2^, 19U8
(sipncd) Dr. Friddrich Gaus"
B. Ribbentrcp^s ?lan -for World Domination - '
The contonts of'- affLdo,vit of Dr. Gaus^ set forth abovo^
coincide, also v/ith tlic instructions i^ivcn by Pdlrbentrop on July 10, l^Ul
(Pros,. Sxo39i, 2896-FS)-to the German Ambassador Ott in Toykc about
'Gcr"Tc.ny's future plan's for dividdnp up the v/orld, a secret telegrcQn,
I
these instructions cane also to the cognizance of "'.DIZSAOCKSn, It is
taken from '"OFiPJAM's files, Tfhc also knov/ about the Gorman plans for
dividini; up the world with Japan, dho pertinent passage from these
instructions reads .as follows:
.' /j
"After the collapse of Russia, however, the
position of the Throe lower Pact sta.tes in the
world will bo so r-ipantic, that the quQstion of
Dnrland's collanSG or the total destruction of the x
English islands, respectively, will only bo a matter
of time. Jaacrican tota.lly isolated from the
rest of the v/crld. wcuJ.d then be faced with our taking
possession of the remaining positions of the British
Unpire which arc impcrta.nt for the Three Power Pcact
countries, I have the unshakable ccnvictiGn that a
carrying through of the new order as desired by us
will be a roattcr of course, and there 7Jculd bo no in-
surmcuntable difficulties if the countries of the
Throe Povjor Pact stand close together rnc^. encounter
every action cf tlv"; Americans vrLth the saiuo 'weapons,
i ask you to report in tlie near future as often as
possible and in detafl on the political situation
there, "
'*k
^-'J!!
This rebuts '^ 'BIZSAV'idKGR's contention that Germany never had such
\
dreams for dividing up tlic worlA, In fact> ho knew then as^ the
follcivin;: exhibits wilj, shcw^ promoted and influenced the Naz^i
aggressive policy T/ltJi all his efforts, -
Those exhibits which cm be found in Pr/osccution Document Book
9 B, with two exceptions, are o.ualysed as follows:
.••••''it;;:'.
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334 IIG-3074 ITSIZSAJJCICilR's m3moranaum from his own
fxlos of S3pt3mb3.r 28, 1940, with his
Doo« Bko S-A typev/rittan si^natura • Copiss sstit to
Ribbantropis bureau,'to PiDilR^IANH, and
otlxjfs* In this TDemprandum for Ribben-
trop, lYillZS^ijlJEjIR records his conference
with the Russian Ambassador in Berlin
on the Tripartite Pact betvraen -Germary,
Japan and Italy.
, ^ . Desoribinr his reply to the Russian Am-
bassador^s inquiry r3cardin{: the meaning
• ^of tliS Tripartite Pact, vYJlIZSAjlGEdR re-
. ^ marks, ,
"During the discussion, I kspt to
' the contents of the cable to Mos
cow of "the tv^3nty~f ifth of this
month, whereby, instead of naming
• • . ' , Anarica as the power at v/hich this
Treaty was aimsd. I usod tlie g-an-
• • oral plirase that it was a warning
'. directed tovrards the democratic
' ' II
•• •; pov/erse" ;
This shows, how WillZSAJJCKilR, rdththe hnov/ledge of VrOilRMAird, pro
motes the anti-.T0st3rn policye
X XX X
Gab la from Military AttaclTS Cfeneral
Boettichar and Charge 8'Affaires Thoi^n
in Washington to the Foreign Office in
Berlin, dated February 26, 1941^ Ten
copies distributed,'to Ribbentrop,
WAIZSiiJlGI^R, Ritter, 7;0JiRl'MH. This
copy taken from the files of bWIZSAdGKHR,
In the cable it is pointed out that as
a result of the spaach of the :^hrer
tlio nerves of JJnglish and American lea
ders are gravely affected#
379 NG-4369
Doc# Bk, 9-D
\
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Hlxhioit No. Documant No«
379 (cont'd) NG-4369
Boo. Bk.. 9~B
1
"Nothing is known about
futuro niGaSuras of Japan,
but one is improssad by
Japan's damand to rula tba
antira Ocaania and tha
papers ara publishing-nispS
about it's anorfiious axton-
sion. Tha quastion comas
up with raspact to tha
British Islas whethar th:^
Fuahrar is going to limit
himself to a war of block
ade, or is going to invada'
One looks towards Spain,
tovjnrds Graaca, to the
sian Gulf, and tha Suaa '
and behind big words, ona
scarcely can hida tha fear
of coming events about which?
after all, ona can't pra-
-dict anything.','
"Tha "English era bringing
tho r-eport that thoy aro
fortifying with pianos av-ery
front -in the Far .Tast, in
tho Middle Fast, in tha
Maditerranaan and in Fngl^^^?
bacausa naw pilots from tha
Fmpira training plan, and_
planas, delivered by Americ^a?
are available in abundance-
That is all bluff, if Eng
land doQS not split her
'forces. Tha truth about the
pilots and tha Amariccn plen-^s
is shovm in my reports.
"Thsn came Roosevelt's new
damand for over 3 billion .
dollars, in particular for
aviation equipmant. As if
under present conditions
that could be of any use,
and hava results in 1941."
This shows WFIZSAFCKTH's and. WQFRMAKN's knowledge of the
alleged weakness of the U- S. which is one of tha basic
reasons why they ware not afraid to promote tha aggression
of Japan against the United States.
-a-
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"Exhibit No. Docuiiiont No.
380 NG-4'a-48
Doc. Bk." 9-B
Sacrat cab la from Ribbantrop tn.
Ambassador Ott in Tokyo of Feb
ruary 27, 1941, taken from
WFIZSAFGiCTR's file'and distribu
ted to WOKRivl^i'fN and Rittar.
Ribbantrop orders Ott to
"US3 all available maans
to induce Japan to take
possession of Singi'.pora
by a. surprise blov; as
soon as possible."
This proves clearly the policy of the German government
to press Japan into the war- •
381 HG-4-449
Doc. Bk. 9-B
•' ''
Secret cable from Ribbentrop to
German Ambassador Ott in Tokyo
of February 285 1941, taken
from tho files of V/TIZSAFCKDR.
Copies sent to WOFRtvlANN and
Hitter.
Ribbentrop reports about the
conference with the Japanese
Ambassador Oshima of February
23, 1941, in Fuschl.
Riboentrop opened the
talk by giving a summary
of the general political
situation. To force Eng
land to beg for peace Japan's
cooperation was important.
She should attack Sifigapore
at once, if at all possible
Vifithout declaration of war
so as to end the war quickly
and to keep the U. S. out
of it.
Oshima answered that the
preparations lor Singapore's
occupation would ,be finished
in May, but preparations for
war should be made against
the U. S. also.
.-22-
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381 (contt) NG-4449
Doo« Bk. 9-B
Hibbantrop ramorlod that tlis Philippinas-
projsct v/ould b3 bsttar postpotied and
a lightning attack on Singapore alore
oarrisd out immadiatolyo As om of tho
most important raasons for this
sug§3stion Ribbsntrop msntioiisd that
AiBrica wovild stay out of tho war bo-
causa of l-iar unpraparadns ss and in
ordor not to risk l-xsr flsat vsst of
liavfaii.
Contents of this conferenco vBre dispatched to Gorman ambassias
and legations, sea Document PS-1834*
This shows tlie decisiT/e attempts of pressing Japan* s ontry into
the war against ingland at a moment vrl^n the United States are not as
yet prepared#
XXX
382- •» NG-4425a
Doc« Bk. 9-B
382 NG—4425b
Doc# Bk. 9-B
Handvo-itten notes of von St-dorf, thd
Foreign Office' liaison vdth the Arny,
of Februcry 28, 1941, discovered in
Foreign Offica filas. Reference is mode
to Japan*.
"1. Telogram from Ribbentrop to
Ott
tplease use e-very means at
your disposal to cause Japan'
to capture Singapore as soon
as possible.*
2« Contra Japan proceeding against
Singapore : ilxtension of I'/ar
(United States of AmericaO malcing
difficult the peace settlement
(huhgry Japan at the peace table)*
'Pro: I'iforal effect. Tying up of
English forces (Japan instead of
Italy). Disturbing imports to ilng-
land#
Return gift: Dutch Hast Indies.
"HovjQver, open tallc in reference to
our plans regarding Russia#
^ (St,S)"
St.Sa refers to \7JlI2S^i-HCISR»
Htzdorf note of 3 March 3, 1941,
Gtzdorf refers to the con-Torsation of
Ribbentrop with Cshima and that
Ribbentrop told him
"In order to finish the war
quickly to force Hngland
.AZ » tViVJ<tVi">iii'it'ii^.ftTiiiiii ^'i'it''?I
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Exhibit No, Document No,
382
Doc# B» 9 - B
NG-iiii2Sb
(Con't) to ask for peace cooperationwith Japan is of importance.
In her orm interest, Japan
should attack as soon as
possible. Decisive blew
against Singapore in crdor to
• dostrosr key position of Eng
land in Sestcrn Asia and to
secure Japan the position in
East Asia, which she can only
acquire in this war. Capture
Of Singapore should take
place v/ith blitz speed and if
possible without declaration of
Y/ar but in the midst of pea.ce
in orrler to contribute to a
quick end of the vrar and to
keep the U.S.A. cut of the
war, "
Answer of Oshima:
"I Y/ill do everything in order
to effect such a policy, "
This shov/s that the policy to press Japan was generally kno^vn in
-the German Foreign Office, including '.EIZSAECICSI''s friend and defense
witness Etzdorf,
31*3
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Foreign Office directive of J^^rch 2,
19l]l signed by Sib'-cntrcp and initialed
bj'' A'SI2SiiECIC3R, informing five G->rnan
ombassios and ton Gorman missions, most
confidontially, on i±ic convorsatLcn be
tween Aibbcntrop and .'inbassador Oghima
on February 23, 19iil.
In tiiis conversation Japan was urged
to enter the war because this would
mean a
"clecisive blow against the
core of the British E.:^iro
.,,A surprise attack by
Japan was the thing necdcT
tc keep Aacrica out of the
^ war. /America v/hich has not
rearmed as yet and would, net
bo very willing to take the
risk of exposing its fleet
west of Havj-aii, then could
dc it oven less...It seemed
to be in tlie interest of
Japan to secure for herself
v/hilo the war was still on
such a positi-n in Eastern
itsia for the coming new
order in the world as she
desires to have in her hand
at the time when peace is
made, djnbassador Oshina
• -2k-
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arrcGd fully rd-th those lines
of reasoning and declared that
ho would do everythinc^ to carry
cut this policy."
The Reich Pcreiipi LUnister
iiicn TTientionGd that if
iincrica declared war because
of Japan's entrance into the
war this vfculd. be a sipn that
she had had anyhovf the in
tention to enter the war sooner
or later. Even if it mirht
be bettor to prevent this,
such an entrance into the war
would be in no way decisive
for the reasons already riven and
could no lonr;cr impede the
final victory of the moraber
states of the Tri-partite Pact,"
This shovra ''•'SIZSuECKER's cooperation in prcnotinr the policy of
Japan's joining the war,
383 PS-1877
(USil-152)
Doc, Bk. 9 B
liomorandun fron Foreign Office files,
no signature, of I'arch 29, 19lil, on
conversation bctv/ccn Ribbentrop and
•latsucka. In this convcrsaticn
•Jatsuoka stated that
",,,th0 Japanese Navy regarded the
danrer of the English Navy as very
unimportant and was also cf ihe view
"that in an encounter with the Morican
Navy the latter could, be
annihilated. However she (the
Japanese Navy) was afrai' that the
Anoricans v/ould net o:q3osc iiicir
fleet to battle so that conflict
wiiii the U.S, might extend for five
years, Feoplc in Japan v/crc very
uneasy about this.
"iho Reich Foreign ^^inister
responded that America could
not do anything against Japa.n
if Singapore wore captured, "
This shows again the Foreign Office policy to push- Jap-an xnto war by
telling her Hie U, S» is not road.y for v/ar.
3814 NG-i4303
Doc, Bk. 9 B
Ilcmorandum "'-•'ElZSAECICER's (from his own
files) dated -pril 3, 19lil, with his-
typev.Txtf-en signature. Ton copies dls-
tribu-bod, among others -bo Ritter, ".''OEIuIflNN,
Erdmaimsdorff,
In his memorandum ".'EIZS^xECI^ER suggests to
Rib 'Ontrop, that Germany shoulrl act in
such a way as tc appear alv/ays on the
-25-
.. I "[ •' 'ill I Uii'ilfi* 1 rii",
:1
defensive with regard to the TJaited
States*
384 NG - 4303 "It is our concers play
the game of fixisg the guilt
Doc* B« 5 - B in such a 7;ay that step by
stay we appear as the ones
attacked* This is necessary
in consideration of our allies,
especially Japan,"
This point was to be kept in mind in
the drafting of protest notes against
the United States.
^IZSAECKER with knowledge of other -defendants started already in April
1341 his "blame the victum policy". Identicar-;.dth his "blame the Poles"
policy in 1939i and "blame the Catholic clergy* policy,, which he persued
when asked about the fate of arrested Catholic clergymen (see brief on
Count V, Catholic Church)
385 PS - 1881
(USA-33) Notes onrjconference between the Pueh-r
rer (Hitler) and the Japanese Foreign
Doc* B* 9 ** B Minister Matsuoka, in the presence of
the Beich Foreign Minister and of
State Secretary Meissner, in Berlin,
on April 4i 1941' Kns typewritten sig
nature of Schmidt of Ribbentrop office.
l&tsuoka reported about his talk with
the Duce v/ho had told him
"You have to be clear about
the importance of your enemy,
Enemy No, 1 is iunerica, and
Soviet Russia is only in second
place *♦,"
Matsuoka said further,
",ev Japan will do everything
in her efforts to avoid a v^ar
with the UoS, In case she (Japan)
should make the decision for a
coup against Singapore the Ja
panese Navy has of course also
to make preparations for a war
against the UaS,
The Fuehrer pointed out
I*.,, that Germany too regarded
a conflict with the tJ,S, as un
desirable, but had already taken
the possibility into account..,"
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In the course of the conference the Fueh
rer then emphasized that
"♦.# if Japan should fee involved
in a conflict v/ith the U#S# ♦ Germany
would immediately accept the Conse
quences# It was immaterial v;ith whom
the U.S. v70uld become involved in
conflict first I Germany or Japan.
"As regards Japanese-j^erican re
lationship, tl^tsuoka explained further
that he has always declared in his
country, that sooner or later a war
with the United States would he un- •
avoidable, if Japan continued to
drive forward as at present. In his
opinion this conflict would hegin
rather sooner thanir later. His argu
ment went onj why should Japan, there?*
fore, not decisively strike at the
right moment and take the risk upon
herself of a fight against America?
Just thus would she perhaps avoid a
war for generations., particularly if
she gained predominance in the South
Seas. There are, to he siire, in Japan
many who hesitate to follow these
trends of thought. Matsnokr was con
sidered in those circles a dangerous
man with dangerous thoughts. He, howr
ever, stated that if Japan continued-
along her present path, she would one
day have to fight anyway and that
this would then be under less favorable
circumstances that at presento
"The Fuehrer replied that he could
v;ell understand the situation of Jifeit-'
suoka, because he himself had teen
in similar situations (the clearing
of the Rhineland, declaration of so
vereignty of armed forces), he too
had been of the opinion that he had
to expl.'it favorable . conditions and
accept the risk of an anyhov/ un-
advoid'able fight at a time when he
himself was still young and full
of vigor. How right he had been in
his attitude had teen proven by events*
Europe nov/ was free-. He would not
hesitate a moment to reply instantly
to any v/idening of the war, be it by.
Russia, be it by ihnerica. Providence
favored those who do not let dangers
come upon them, but who bravely face
them#"
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ConfeiD'jcs metEDrandum, ivith the type
written signature of Schmidt of Ribben-
trop's office, about the conference
between the Reich Foreign I-Cinister Ribben'
trop and the Japanese Foreign Mnister
Matsuoka, in Berlin, April 5» 1941*
"In conclusion, the Reich
Foreign Minister once again
summarized the points he wanted
i-iatsuoka to take back to Japan
with him from his tripi
1. Germany had already won the
war. With the end of this year
the world would realize this. Even
England would have to concede it,
if it had not collapsed before then,
and America v/ould also have to re
sign herself to this fact.
2. There were not conflict-interests
between Japan and Germany. The fu
ture of both countries could be regu
lated for the long run on the basis
that Japan should predominate in the
Far East, Italy and Germany in Europe
and Africa.
3* Yvhatever might happen, Germany v/ould
win the war. But a t would hasten vic
tory if Japan v/ould enter the war. Such
an entry into the v/ar was undoubtedly
more in the interest of Japan than in
that of Germany, for it offered a uni-f
que opportunity which would hardly
return again, for the fulfillment of
the'national objectives of Japan, a
chance vvhich would make it possible for
her to . play a really leading role in
East Asia#
Matsuoka replied that he himself could
only repeat that he had long been of
the opinion that ©very nation would be
offered an opportunity only once in a
thousand years. Japan v/as confronting
such an opportunity, and she would
have to assume the risk connected with
it. Sh® 'TOUld have to act decisively
at the right mement in order to take
advantage of this unique opportunity."
In his cross-examination, defense witness
Paul rtto Schmidt admitted (Tr. p. 17824)
that '.TEIZS/^CKER was constantly advised
about conferences between Ribbentrop and
Foreign statesmen# Thus, he was also in
formed about the help Germany had promised
Japan in case of her entry into the war#
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Cable from Geraan al-;ibassacVor Ott In Tokyo
tc the Goriiian Foreirn liinister in Berlin,
iated'ITay 5^ 19Ul, to,ken from
files# Coyies '''istributed, anonr others,
to '""OSTai^FN, Rittor and Srdmannsdorff,
Infcrns on Araorican-Japanosc nofotiaticns
for a peaceful settlement#
Cable from Ott in Tokyo to the Reich
Fcreini L'linister, dated "hy 6, I9I4I, taken
from b'BIZSiiDCI'SIUs files. Conies tc
'TCGri.'Icitter, Errlmannscborff #
Gives infomation about Ott's conversation
witi Ila.tsucka in Tolcyo o.bcut possible
peaceful settlement of xOierican-Japanese
problems# Ott points out that he tried
ar;ain to -.'drect Japanese policy tevTar'''s
Sinpapore in opposition tc the Anerican
"dplomatic maneuvers.
Cable frc'i Ott in Tolc '^-o tc the Reich
Foreifn ilinister, dated :.Iay 11, 19lil,
taken from '.'DIZSaEGIGTR,'s files^ copies
TOro sent to "'GSIilLd'IN, Bitter, Srrpmanns-
dorf,
Ott reports that he has infcrme 1 'tatiuoka
very enerpetically that the German govern
ment could net ar.Tcc; to Japanese 'Icalinrs
T/ith Vashinpton without havinp received
the opinion of the otb-or /pels pcY/crs,
Tolerram from '.HIZSnSCKEri to Ribbontrop
mth '.•.'EIZSAZCI-3R's t^piey/rittcn signature
and to.ken from b'EIZS.'JuCICBRfs files, dated
lfe.y IS, 19Ul.
bHIZSAECICiBi. gives Ms opinion on the
American-Japanese dealinos:
't3vor3r political treaty
bcbTOcn Japan an \ the U.S.i'j.,
is un'lesirable at the present
time# The prosent draft of the
treaty, however, woul-"'. involve
Ja'san turnino <a'vav from us* It
would leave the battlefield,
arainst Bnpland and the USA
to us alone. Iho Tripartite
i-act viould be ddscreditod#
Directly toe anti-Gcraan is,
in the closinp sentence in Roman
Numeral -b.'/o, the sanctioninp
of U.S. help to England,
"As the treaty -draft is already
in ^>.shinpton, it has alrea '.jr
had a damardng effect. The
effort must be made to attack
it ncfw, after it has been dxavm
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Up, SO that ths traaty is reTOr con-
oludad.
"In tha avsnt tliat it should n6t "b©
possibls to pravant tha troaty, cara
would ha"70 to ba talon that Japan is
practically spaaking, again brought
into lina , Tha vary laast would ba
that Japan davalops its halp to Oar-
many according to tlia sraiB principlas
as tha USA lialp to ilngland,"
Ta legram from Ribbantrop to Carman Aiti-
bassador Ott in h'ashitigton, dated Jure
11, 1941, Copj'' talcan from V/jUZS^llGKilR* S
files. Copies sant to 'JOJR'it'iJTi'J, Rittar,
Zr dmann s do rff,
Ribbentrop informs Ott about tlaa status
of tlo Japanese-Amarican negotia.tions,
danouncas Nomura ^vhom ha alls gas
wants Aid rioan-japane sa understanding,
and %'ro.rns against him, Ott is' instructed
to strengthen Matsuoka in his positiva
attitude arainst the U,S,
This saries of top secret diplomatic
communica.tions on US-Japar.3se nego
tiations proves that h'ZIZSi'iJJCiiSR is vary
much afraid that Japana sa-U,S, rJgotiations
might result in an undarstanding, and
suggests all means of diplomacy be
usad against such an undar standing# His
Foreign Office collaborators have
Icnowladga of and partioipata in this
policy.
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Tslsf^raiii from Gorman /ambassador Ott of
Tolcyo'to Edich Foroifrn Minister, dated
May 6, 1941, taken from tie files of
V/OjlElI^J'n'T and initialed by w'OilRI'IAM,
Copy sent to Ritter,
Ott advises the Foreign Office of the
results of his conference with Matsuokn
in connoction with the United States*
proposal tlmt Japan join her in a se
cret entente, to maintain the status quo
in the Far 3ast,
NG-4454 b Cable from German Ambassador Ott, Tokyo
to Foreign Minister in Berlin, of Hry 10,
1941, Copy taken from "rOilR''t^H's files,
also initialed by uOJjRM/iIJl'J, Copy sent
to Hitter.
This cable reports that Matsuoka had
inquired v/hether any ansv^er had been
received from Berlin as to the /unerican
proposal and that Matsuoka had expressed
the hops that tlie answer v/ould not be
long in coning since the Japai^ese Am
bassador in V.'ashingtcn v;as being pressed
for a reply by Secretary Hull. In the
interim ?!atsuoka proposed to instruct
' tlie Japaioese Ambassador- in 'Washington
to inquire wbetlier America was prepared
to pledge herself: 1) not to enter tl:©
Jluropeari war and 2) to persuo.de China
to negotiate directly with Japan with
out the participation of the U. S« In
that event, Japan would be prepared to
, discuss the U, S. proposal.
Ott reports that when lie
"pointed out for a second time"
that tlie American proposal was obviously
designed to deter Japan from taking any
action in the South Pacific, and more
•particularly against Singapore, Matsuoka
had declared tliat he had no intention of
permitting his hands to be tied so far
as tlie pacific Oce an was-concerned. He
7,rould certainly not relieve the Americans
of tlieir anxiety for tlia safety of Bri
tish possessions in the Pacific. Ott
then observed that the time might come
v/l-Bn America's actions must be considered
ae attacks despite the fact that there had
been no formal declaration of war* Mat
suoka had replied that, in that event, the
teriiis of the pact would be binding on Japan.
Both these cables were sealed matters and came, therefore, to
V/jJIZSA/IGKjIR' 3 attention.
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Tolcgrojn fron Ribbontrop to Ott in
TokyOj dated 11^ 1941- Copy
taken fron "TDERILl® filcs^ contains
VJOERleHN's initial. Copy also sent
to Rittcr. As secret i:ic?.ttcr it carao
also to A'EIZS.^CiCER's attention.
Tclegrojn instructs Ott to transniit
to. Matsuoka the follovdng inforrja.tion
as to Gorniany's position on the U.S.
proposal to Japan:
The Reich Government thanks the Japa-
noso Govcrroont for informing it of
tho proposal put forth by the United
States and vri.shes to state its position
on this ijiiportant matter very franlcly.
Basically tho struggle in v/hich Gondcny
and Italy find thoraselves is a lifc-
and-dcath struggle upon v;hich tho fate
of Japan depends, as Vvoll, Should
Germany and Italy bo defeated, then
Japan would find herself face to face
with an overpo'wring ;nglo-Saxon
corlition Tvhich would undoubtedly
cd.so include Soviet Russia, and
possibly Fr<?nco, end vdiich would
offoctivcly put can end to any attempt
by Japan to gain Lobonsraum in the
Far East. It is obvious that it is of
tho utmost iiuport-TjicG to prevent tho
U.S. from entering tho war, but
wiiothcr or not tlois will bo possible
depends entirely upon tho attitude of
that country herself. Should it bo
tho intent of the iGadir^g figures in
the U.S. to load /jiiorica into the
war. then their first course v/ould be
to pave the Y/ay for <"^1 attack on
Germany and Italy by wooJ^ening tho
Tripartite Pact ond isolating those
tvro nations.
On tho other hand, if the President
had advanced the propssal for purely
tactical reasons, in order to create
insecurity in Jap.an, then all the more
reason for being just as clever in re
pulsing such an attor.'.pt.
In view of these considerations, con
cludes Ribbontrop, the Reich govornment
v^ould suggest that tho Japcnoso reply
embody tho following points; 1) Ihc
Japanese Govenviiont is intorostod in ail
attempts to prevent the v/ar from sprea
ding further but rjgrots that she has
noted evidence of un-noutrai acts on the
part of the -iioricans and 2) should tho
i;iorxc.an government actuaily intend to
avoid entering the v/ar and also to
coasc such un-noutrai activities, then
the Japanese Goverivaent would be pleased
^32 -
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to give the propose! further con-
sidcretion. In vicv: of the inportence
of the mettor to the Tripartitie Pact
the Reich government vrciuld appreciate
an opportunity to pc?.ss on the Japanese
reply to the U.S. before its dispatch.
This proves how with the cooperation of the diploraatic maclTinory
of the dofendantSj the U.S. Japanese negotiation v;crc sabotaged in
order to promote Ja-pans entry into the v/ar.
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389 NG-4398 D
Doc. B- 9-B
389 NG-4398 F
Doc. B. 9-B
Telegram from the GaiTiian Begstion
in Mexico to Foreign Cfiica in
Berlin, signed Richard and Ruadt
(German Minister to Mexico),
dated iipril 16, 1941, tahen from
the files of the Political Divi
sion. (Chief , Deputy
Frdma nnsd 0 rff)
"Received $50,000-
v\/arding arranged."
For-
Talegram from German Minister in
Mexico Ruedt to Foreign Office
Berlin, dated Mexico, .April 23,
1941. This telegram was dis
tributed in seven copies, among
others to Hibbentrop, v/FIZShF-
CKFR, V/0FRIjIAIT>3 Ritter.
This cable gives information
about German sabotage agents.
Among them, as number four,
Agent Rekowski, working with
a dynamiting organization
"in the U.S. for sabotage
in munition plants ana on
ships."
Cable from German Minister in
Mexico to Foreign Office B?rlin,
of April 29, 1941, informing
that two of the agents mentioned
in HG-439^ B have departed to
Japan.
Cable to Foreign Office in B3r-
lin from G3rman Minister Ruedt
in Mexico, dated May 2, 1941.
Cable distributed in the Foreign
Office in ten copies, among
others to Hibbentrop, V/FIZSAFCKFR,
W0'i7RJ;IAI>TNT, Ritter, and Rrdmanris-
dorff.
The German Minister warns that
these agents endanger our policy
in Mexico.
Cable from German Minister Ruedt
in Mexico to uhe Foreign Office
Berlin of May 2, 1941. ^Two
copies distributed in the Foreign
Office.
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Barlin is informad that a naw
•G.^rman agant, who is a Mexican
citizen, will be active and that
communications will be forwarded
through the legation. Details
are given about names of other
agents, their cover addresses,
etc. The German Minister in
forms the Foreign Office that
$10,000 are already paid to
the agents and $30,000 more
are in his hand for future
payment.
Cable from German Minister
Ruedt in Mexico to the Foreign
Office, dated May 29, I941.
Ten copies distributed in the
Foreign Office to Ribbentrop,
VSIZ3A3CICSR, Ritter,
and Frdmannsdorff.
Gorman Minister Ruedt forwards
communication from the agent
working in the U.S.A. who is
at present in Mexico.
....Latest succGSSGSs
Merchant Marine in Boston
destroyed through fire.
Forest fires in Jersey...-
Dr. Scholz, Boston (Ger
man Consul General) should
be contacted."
It is further mentioned that
$.5?000 have been paid under
the condition that newspaper
clippings are to be forwarded
as proof for the action per
formed .
These secret cables, which all came to the attention
of vniZSA:^KUR show that the Foreign Office defendants
were connactea with the sabotage acts against the U.S. be
fore Pearl Harbor. This rebuts all statements to the
affect that they did not want to provoke the U. S.
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A* Copy of a from the
Reich^'Eoreign Minister to Ott
ih'.TbliyQ'i''aated July'^ IO^ -1941*
taken from WOSRIvjAi'51's> fiXe and.
initialed and underlined by
him* Copies to Bohlo, ICepplor,
Ritter and others*
Ribbcntarop'rGq.uests an inimodiato
comprohensive analysis of the
situation in To3<ya, v;ith emphasis
on the follov7ing points, alD of
which are underlined in the text^
by MOmmrn:
1* Current relations betvrcen Japan
and the United States:
2, The reaction of the Japanese
public, and in particular, of in
fluential military and government
circles, to the United States
Qccupation of Icelaoid*
Ribbontrop expresses the fear that
Japan might engage in the "short
sighted" policy of coming to some
understanding with America* Ho
warns-
"I need not emphasize
that this, as I have
already indicated,
would bo a very short
sighted policy, and
that by following it,
Japan might miss the
groat historic, never
to bo repeated,
opportunity*"
Ribbontrop oxprossos faith in
Japanese foreign policy* He is
certain that Japan would not
miss
"this uniq.uo opportunity
to solve the Russian
q.uestion, as well as
to expand to the south
and settle the Chinese
question «•••• tt is
naturally in our own
Interests that Japan
should want to exp.and
to the south ♦••* ♦
every reeve tov/ard ex
pansion by Japan v/ill
bo fundaraontally
approved by us*"
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(Thi^ passage is Underlined
^d~m^ked for.' ^peciaX
g-t'tgntlon 'WOERiviANN.)
Ribbentrop instructs Qtt to use
alL means •Q,i his conma^ to
bring Japan' into the v/ar against
Russia^
"The sooner the better.."
B» WOERIvi/iNN'a copy, initialed
by him of Ambassador Ott'a rep3y
from Tokyo- of July 14^, 1941 to
the cable of July 10* Copies
distributed to at least ten
fvereign Office desks,; among
them Ritter*
0.tt reports that Japanese-
American relations are
oharactcrized by increasing
tension, and that there is
the general feeling in high
Japanese military and naval,
circles, that Japan can only
strengthen her position in
the Par East in opposition to
the British and Americans. (This
is underlined by WOEEi'i/iNN-)
att further discusses the matter
of the delay in the ansv/er of
Ribbontrop's "personal message"
to Matsuoka and then goes on to
say that ho is concentrating all
his efforts tov/ard achieving a
Japanese declaration of v/ar on
Russia at the earliest possible
moment, using Ribbentrop^s
arguments (see document a) and
that he believes his efforts
will bo successful.
Those secret cables - revealing the Foreign Office
policy toward Japan - (s.ince they v/cro material classified
Top Secret) ta the attention of
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Memorandum of WEIZS/iECICER,
from his o-m f iloa with his
•^ppwritt^n signature,
dated August "H , "1941 jc
directed to Ribbentrwp,
suggesting that Roosevelt's,
appeal for peace should be
distorted by derogatory
publicity.
TVEIZSAECICSR reports to Rib-
bentrop that he has received
information firora Vichy, as
T/ell as from '^Tashington, that
President Roosevelt is
planning to launch an appeal
for peace* VffilZS/iEGICER v/rites
that the Poroign Office should
in my opinion, con
sider Y/hcthor this
allegedly impending
Roosevelt action could
be hindered somehovY
through a counter
campaign in the press.
T recommend that Dr«
Megerle be aslced to
maice suggestions."'
El;1PH/i.SIS: Indicates WEIZ-
SiiEOICSR's efforts to sabotage
U. S. plans for peaceful.
Settlement with Japan*
This ahov/a l/VEIZaAECICER* a personal efforts to sabotage
any peacefui settlement between the U. S* and Japan, 'thus
promoting the attack against the U. S*
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Japanese minutes of an inter
view hold on August 19^ 19A1
between Japanese Vice Minis-
•^cr Amau and German iunb.asaa—
dor btt.
Ott advanced the idea
that it v/ould be to the
advantage of Japan also
if at this time she
attacked Russia from the
East."'
Japanese condensed report of
a conference hold between the
German 'Anbassador Ott and the
Japanese Vice Minister Amau
on August 29, 19A1.
^he Vice Minister infonsied Ott
that ho had received the
impression
that the American
authorities are pre
pared to enter into
negotiations in order
to break the deadlock."
The ansT/er of Ambassador Ott:
"Vis usual, Aierica will,
try to gain time by begin
ning negotiations with
Japan,; and meanwhile will
put forth still greater
efforts to cany out her
objectives. Therefore, I
think that precautions
must be taken against
America's aoheme to pro
long these negotiations,
so that this might work
to her advantage."
Condensed report of a conference
botv^een Porcign Minister Toyoda
and Geiman Aabassador Ott on.
August 30, 19A1*
"att: In the notice sent
to the German govemmont
on the 2nd July, the state
ment is mad© that Japan is
making preparations for^
every possible eventuality
in her relations with Russia
and Ax^ierica, but are the
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Exhibit No«. Documont No«
393 PS-3733 C(Coni??d)
Eoc» B» 9 - B
intontions of the Japan
ese govomncnt stall the
same todaj^S Is there any
possibility that Japan
rnay participate' 'the
R^so-G-cman -war?
"Toyoda: Japan's. prepara
tions are navr making head-
vzay, and it will, take more
tine for their conplotion.."
These documents show the Foreign Office efforts to
discourage Japan in accepting a peaceful solution v/ith U- S»
394 EG-3438
Doc. B.^9 - B
Copy of a Top Secret Teletype from
the Geiman Naval. Attache in Tolgro,
dated 22 August 1941 ^ forwarded by
Rittcr, over his handvaritten
signature, to the Foreign Minister.
The Teletype, v/hich Ritter desig
nates as "'a remarkable report",
gives the opinion of Japanese naval
officers. According to them Japan
will not attack Russia and hopes to
avoid war v/ith England and the
United States, while moving south
into Thailand and Indo-China to
secure valuable raw materials and
shift her base of attack against
Burma and Singapore. The next step
would bo to attack Manila and
occupy the Dutch East Indies.
It is pointed out that this only
reflects the opinion of the Navy,
and that the Japanese iLrmy may
not necessarily agree.
Through this cable v/hich came to NEIZSASCrSR'a attonticoi,
he became familiar v/ith the different tendencies prevailing in
Japanese government circles and with the fact that the final
decision as urged by the Germans was not as yet made.
- ijD -
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Exhibit No.. DocurACnt No. ^ .
395 K(M-3S§
Doc» B* 9 " B
r • I'
Gable fipm Gorman An^assador
Gtt in Toi^y,o^ to the? Poroign
Ministry in Berlin, dated
AUg^t"3Q, -1941; fifteen copies
tade, and distributed t9 Ribben—
trop, ^TEIZ^ClCERj. Bohlp,." WOEHivL™j
Er^mannsdorff, and others*
Ott repoorts on his interviev/ vrith
the Japanese Foreign Minister, to
whom ho pointed out the recent
weakening of the military reserves
cxf the Soviet Union, and the
unpreparcdness of American armament*
He told the Japanese Foreign
Minister that Japan could proceed^
without risk,, to take the
necessary stops to protect her
position and prestige in the
Far East*
"My request to have the
toxt of the Konoye
message Toyoda did not
fulfill*
"Toyoda was during the
conversation very re
served, as is his v^ay*
As I leam, the useful
ness of the Nonoye
message is much discussed
in Army and Navy circles.
Although in view of the
attitude of the Konoyo
Government one could have
ezpected efforts to
establish a modus vivendi,
even if temporary, with the
United States,^ still the
nov;s of a message of the
Prime Minister to Roosovolt •
was unexpected* The play
given this step in the /iTucrioan
press has been painfully
received here and has also
left in govemr.iont circles
the uncertain foaling that
possibly, other effects than
the ones hoped for may result*
The government is trying to
keep the press treatment to-
a lin^ited scope therefore#
Qtt"
From this secret cable WEIZSASCIsER learned the reaction
to his policy in Japan*
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Exhibit Ko» Docunent No,
39§ NC^370
Doc« Bjf- ^ * B
V/BlZSZiEGICSR' & meraorc^um "o-ith
his typQ7^i-ttoh signature^
'initialed by WOEfSvLiIM; faxxn
tho'fiies of dated
SeptoBbcr ii-f 19M ? about a con-
ferenoG vath the Japanese
ijjnbassador Oshinia*- This iiemo—
randura v;as sent to Hibbentrop,
WOSHvjANIT, Erdi:iannsdorff and Hit
ter, and also to the /jnerica
expert,. Dieckhoff XTho initialed
it.-
VffllSa/iSCKKR reports that he had
infornied /iT-ibassador Oshina of the
contents of the recent Japanese-
iiiiierican talks,: regarding which
Oshiaia had been kept in the dark
by his oTOi govormaent.-
Oshijna assured HSIZS/iSGICSR ^wever,
that only yesterday, he again
telegraphed to To^qyo- his position
on the subject of Japanese-dlinerican
relations. YffilZS/iSGICEIR states:
"This position taken by
Oshiioa is in full accord
with the one desired by us,
so that actually, little waa
left for me to add,"
\?EISS/^C]vaR cheered up the somewhat
disheartened iimbassador, by asserting
the follo-.ving:
"... I cannot imagine at aJX
that ar.wng the Japanese
people, and correspondingly
in Japanese politics, the
militaristic iristincts should
not finally gain the upper
hand."
This meraorandun of TOIzaABCiiEH subnitted by hto to
Ribbentrop sho^vs his active rolo in pressing Japan to egression,
^ k2 "
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Exhibit No,. Docunont No,
397 ' m-M-Sl
Doc» B» 9 B
Mcmorandun, typOTTritten
signature of Braun, Berlin,'
Septcnbcr 12, 1941, aubnitted
to WOERi^UiNlT,
In this meaoranduni Braun refers,
to- his conversation v/ith Mr,- Kato,
a. Japanese nov/spaper representative^
l-Ir,. Kata, v/ho is regarded as a
reliable friend of Gorriiany, felt
alerted because Roosevelt in his
last, speech did not mention Japan,
Thus Kato alerted Braun that in
Tolqya ideas are ventilated on
coning to- teixis with the United
States and England^
The submittance of this memorandum to MOW'UJ^ shows
his connection with these aggressive vrar plans.
398 N&-1433
Doc* B» 9 ~ B
Copy of Top Secret Telegram from
\7ashington to Berlin signed
Boetticher and Thomsen, and
initialed by WEIZSzlECiCER,- The
telegram concerns Japan's
aggressive intentions in the
Par East, dated 21 Septci.iber
1:941,. Distributed in ten copies,
ar.iong others, to WDStS.I/iNN, Hitter,
Ersmannsdorff •
Boetticher reports that the Japanese
Military Attache in V/ashington,
General Isoda, expressed fears of
British and /imerican military
intervention in case of a Japanese
attack on Russia or Japanese
occupation of Thailand and the
Dutch East Indies,
Boetticher relieved his fe^s by
picturing England and iirrorioa as
Weak and unable to attack.
Iflien General Isoda reiterated his
Concern over possible iimerio^
action in the Pacific, Boetticher
encouraged him by suggesting Japan
Could out off the /imerican supply
line to the Dutoh East Indies, and
that the v/as just trying
to gain time.
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Exhibit ITOfc Docuncnt No.
39,8 NG^14P'
cont* d
Doc» B» 9 - B
}!]/hen I pointed put to
kin that it was'necessary
to see also the v/ealc side
of the opponent, and that
behind the brilliant
iiX-ierican facade, was grave
worry and uncertainty,. he
replied that nov/ ho undor-
atood why /inerican policy
waa centered on gaining
tine» Now ho knov7 enoughs"
This telegran shows the collaboration of the Geman foreign
Office representatives, in the U» S» in the planning for war
against the U.. S*
399 NG-2761
Doc» B». 9 *" B
\fflIziSAECI^'s, Eienorandun from
his own files vath his type
written signature, dated
26 Soptombcr i9h^^, recording
his Interviev/ with the Hungarian
Minister on Japan's future plansy
Oopics T/ere sent to V/OEHI-'L'iNN,
Erdp.iannGdori'f and Bitter*
17SIS3AEGICER reports that he had
previously told the Hungarian
Minister Stojay, that he believed
fH Japan's historic
hour had struck.. One could
count on the fact that the
Japanese Government would
not let this p-pportunity
pass by unused*."
Today the liinistor had told
\ffiISS/iECIC3R~that the Japanese
Government follov/s a policy
of keeping Soviet forces in
the Ear East tied up»
This report of ffilZSiiECia® shovra, his polioy-siaking
rale in the plaming for war agai^t the U. S.
- JA
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Exhibit Ko.. Document No.-
400 m-2682
l5oc* B» 9 - B
Affidavit by Hansjuergen Reinecige,
former aperations expert V7ith th^
German naval high command, regard,
ing German Foreign Office parti-r
cipation In drav/ing Japan into -fch©
"vjar against the United States,
dated 30 September i947«-
Reinioke states, that by virtue
of his participation in discussions
be-b.-reen the High Command for Naval
Warfare, and the Foreign Office
liaison official, it is knovmi to
him that continuous attempts were
made in 1941 to draw Japan into the
war on the side of the Axis*. Ambas
sador Hitter participated frequent
ly in these discussions.
Reinicke has no doubt that ITSIZ—
S^IEOI^ER was similarly active in
promoting the Japanese entry into
the war*. He concludes this from
WEIZSiiEGIffiR'Sl close relations with
Admiral Fricke, former Chief of
the High Command for Naval Warfare^.
The latter vra-s ip,ibued with the idsa
of winning Japan over to enter the
v/ar on Germany^s side,.
This exhibit has already been discussed in a previous part
of this brief in connection with the oral testimony of Reinioke^
401 NG-4450
Doc* B*. 9 - B
V/EIZS^CiCSR*s. memorandum, initialed
by him, to Ribbentrop, dated
October 14^ 1941»
WEIZSAECICER refers to a DilB press
dispatch from Tokya of Ootober -I3j.
1941, and advises Ribbentrop that
discussions as provided by the Tri
partite Pact and suggested by Ott,
would not moan anything at the
present time,
they probably v/ould
not contribute to the
activation of Japanese
policy,."
This proves, that V/EIZSAECI<ER did not thinlc too much about
promoting of discussions of the Tripartite Pact, implying that
other ways seemed to be better*.
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Exhibit No.. Document No.
402 NC-4451
Doc. B. 9-B
TelfSgram from Ambassador Ott in
ToltyO' to the Foreign Oi^ice in
Berlin, taken from YyEIZSASOI^IR's.
files, dated October 11^ 1941#
Ott'a. cable gives a datailed
analyais of the current ati^ngth
and preparednesa of the Japanese
Navy and of the possibility of
its going into action in the near
future* He points out that the
Navy T/ould be much better prepared
to attack than the Juray and that
the morale and training, particu
larly of the officers' corps, is
outstanding* The Navy is quite
prepared, reports Ott, to take over
its share of the action to\7ai*d the
South but exact plans (whether to
attack Singapore before or after
occupying Thailand, whether to
occupy the Philippines or to avoid
encircling them, or v^ether to
blockade Singapore and to
simultaneously attack Borneo and
Sumatra) are tentative# jllthough
the complete naval plans are
supposed to be top secret, Ott
has been able to discover that
an attack on Singapore is no
longer considered possible, and
gives the reasons for this* An
action taking in the Philippines
and protecting the flank by •
simultaneously occupying Thailand
and bloclcading Singapore appears
the best guarantee that the Japanese
would be able to take possession
of the British and Dutch oil
producing areas in Borneo and Sumatra-
This operation seems fairly certain
of success, but it appears doubtful
that these positions could be held
in the event of a relatively long
v/ar v/ith the Anglo-Saxons#
"For this reason it is a
matter of the utmost im
portance to know T/hat the
Axis powers intend doing
after the Russian campaign
and whether, after England's
collapse, they v/ill be
v;illing and in a position-
to provide aimed assistance
to Japan against the United
States#"
This secret oeble came to the attention of VffllZaABCITffi show
ing that he ms kept oonstantly infonnea on the progress of the
steps initiated by himi
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Exhibit No* Document NOf . ^
403 MG-^52 Memorandum v/ith the handvaritiBn
signature of Erdmannsdorff^ dated
Doc. B. 9-B October 18, 1941, sent to ami
initialed by '^ yiiJIZSjiECidSR-
Erdmannsdorff points out that the
recent cabinet change in Japan
is an improvement according to
Qshima's. judgments.
Attached is a memorandur.i by
Legation Secretary Braun, dated
October 18„ 1941, signed by Braun
^ and submitted through Erdmannsdorff
and initialed by Erdmannsdorfi,, to
the State Secretary Y/BI2SAECKER,
giving an appraisal of the nev/
cabinet.. Braun pointa out that the
^ ' new Japanese cabinet is a notable
improvement from the viev/point of
the Axis# However, Braun does not
think that the cabinet, eapecially
Foreign Minister Tojo-, will, urge
• for a quick entry of Japan into the
war#
Erdmannsdorff points out that the
contents of Braun's memorandum should
be submitted to the Foreign Minister
for his report to the Fuehrer#
This proves that the Political Division worked regularly
on the Japanese situation and that the defendant V/EI2SAECiCER
kept abreast of develogments#
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Exhibit No» Document No*
UOkr KG- 2^453
Doc. B. 9-B
Urg®^"t handTJritten teletype of Oct,.
10,_ 1941 f from VffllZSiiECICER to
Ribbentrop with copiea to 'iVOERJiAJ^W
and Erdmannsdorff«.
•WEIZSAECI03R points out that Oahima
has told him that the new Japanese
cabinet has to be regarded as an
improvement^ but that Oshima is
critical about Togo r/ho is a man
without a policy of his o^m#. iTSIZ-
SASCIvSR adds that Erdmannsdorff v/ili
give more details about the members
of the cabinet after he has seen
OshiJna*
This proves V/EISSAEGKER'fi- activity in promoting the
aggressive war policy and his pride that a Japanese Cabinet^
more favorable to the oggrossivo v/ar plans has boon appointed.
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Exhibit No» Document Ko»
2tP5
Doc, B. 9"B
Mcmoi'O.nduiii from Erdriiannsdorff
vith his handvn?itt^n signati^e,
da-ted October 18, 19M > popiea
to 'vTEIZaAB^ICER,. v/h® initialed
it, and to TOEmiiW, about •
Erdmannsdorff a discussion ^7ith
Qshima on the new Japanese
cabinctf.
Erdmannsdonff reports that he
sounded out Oshima, who had point
ed out that he, Erdmannsdorff,
with his knowledge of Japanese mat
ters,, v/ould undoubtedly realise that
the pendulum there did not awing
quickly from one extreme to the other^
a fact v/hich would explain v;hy an
extreme nationalist cabinet had not
been appointed at once*
It was Oshima's opinion, Ersiunnns-
dorff further reports, that in
concluding the Tripartite Pact, the
Japanese government must have been
avjare that g3:^ater East Asia could
be acquired only by pushing "with
the sword" to the Souths- This
Campaign had already been planned,
T/ith only the question left open as
to •when it should be released,
possibly to coincide "vvith Gemnan
operations against Great Britain#-
In concluding, Oshima had stressed
against the fact tliat the new
Cabinet could not be regarded as
an extreme rightist one and that
aside from Togo there v/ere other
members vAio could not be considered
to be film and energetic politicians.
This shows that the Political Division, subordinate to
WEIZSAECICER and WOEEiMWW, had direct contact with Oshinia, now
sentenced to life for his aggressive acts.
_ 49
'aV-tiWilil'nt'Vlfri'i ti*-- »-¥• IIhi'iWliirtfirn-^fii'i'r' I iriiA'-ri j...
11
»
••
• -Wl*
"
-a
.\; • --mi;
••' '-'j'
' f
• ]
m mmvl
•J': • •
' ••,
'V'" '
. V
•)
'iJh': W'll?
Exhibit DocimiGnt No.
406 PS-2898 Cable from the Gorman Ambassador
(USA-163) to Tolc/a,. Ott, of November 3, 194-1,
Doc. B. 9-3 to the Foreign Officet. Advance
copies sent to Roich Foreign Minister,
to the State Secretary ('VTBIZSAECI'iER) ,
to the Under State Secretary for
Political Affairs (\70ERIvIAIIN) ••
Qtt reports about his conference
vrith the Japanese Foreign Minister
In this conference the Japanese
Foreign Minister mentioned that
the American proposals were
unacceptable •.
"Japan did not fear a failure
of the negotiations and hoped
that in such a case Germany
and Italy would be on the side
of Japan in Accordance ;Yith the
Three pov/er Pact.."
Ott, so reads his cable, responded
that
there could be no doubt
about Germany's future posi
tion- The Japanese Foreign
Minister answered that he
concluded from ny (Otf s.)
words, that Gezmary in such
a case would regard her
relationship V7ith Japan as
a oarmon fate* I responded
that in my opinion Germany
v/ould surely be ready to make
a reciprocal agreement on
this- To this the Foreign
Minister said that it v;as
possible that he v/ould soon
come back to th is po int •••
This' Shows that \7EIZ3ASCiaiIIl and mm>mm kept abreast
continually on the developments in the Par East-
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Exhibit No# Docuriont No*
407 1^-4421
Doc. B. 9-B
Tt70ERIiANN* a nemorandum \7ith
his typcT/ritton signature to
ErdBannsdorff, dated
November 4j 19M concerning
efforts to dravr Japan into the
v/ar#. Copy sent to and
initialed by iVEIZSAECi<SR,.
WGSEf-iANN'a nomorandum conveying
instructions from Ribbentrop^
suggests that a message be sent
to Ambassador Ott^ compiled of
excerpts from cables- from Wash
ington, indicating that the
present situation is expeoially
favorable to Japan to realize
her political ambitions in the
Par East since the United States,
is not yet in a position to
interfere with Japan' a action
in the Par Eastj Ott is to
inform Stahnor of this fact in
order that the latter con point
it out to leading Japaneae
personalities*
This time it Is WOIjSlIANN, who, in line with Ribbontrop'a
policy, is using the Gozman diplomatic machineiy for
promoting Japan'a aggression#.
408 HJ-437i A.
Doc. 3. 9-B
^?El2aAECICER'a cablo over his
typGvnritton signature to Ambassa
dor Ott, through the hands of
•\i70ERJ.iAMN (initialed by him) and
Erdm^nnsdorff, copies, to Dieokhoff
and others#. This cable summarizes
reports from the Gorman Military
Attache in V/ashington, dated
November 1941*'
^TBIZSAEOivER advises Ambassador
Ott to utilise the follov/ing
points in discussions with high
Japanese personalities#
iimerican policy is designed to
keep Japan out of the -v/ar# In the
event of Japanese acticai in East
Asia, Americans would be confront
ed with the dila:nma of either
suffering a blow to their
dignity or going to war* In the
latter case, America, then involv
ed in a two-front v/ar, would have
to curtail radically her aid ta
Britain# At present, the United
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Doc. B.
NG-4371 a
(Cont'd)9-b'
liQQ 'm-h372-
Doc. B. 9-B
Statea aro attempting to
intimidate Japan, hoping to
prevent her from ontoring the \7ar.
"American tacties are
designed,, aa they have
been in the past irrjo
years, to deceive their
opponents and to hide
their ov/n weakness."
Cable concludes v/ith the request
that the above information be
utilized in conjunction with
Sable No., 20A7*
Copy of Cable No. 2047? datod
6. Kovomber ^ 941 and dispatched
on 9 November 1941, over Ribbcai—
tropes signature, taicen from
V/OSKvlAllN's. files.. Copies sent to
•WEIZSs/iEGi^ and Erdmannsdorff,
among others.
The follov/ing information is to be
utilized in talks with high
Japanese officials and is to be
passed on to Stahmor when he
arrives ; iunorioan propaganda is.
amcd at frightening Japan, but
actually, the United States are
attempting to mask the real weak
ness of their position.
Intelligence received by the German
Embassy in Washington, indicates
that the ihnerican armament industry
is unable to develop production to
such a peak as to enable the country
to wage a trro—front *.wir and continue
supplying Er^land and Russia.
The United States aro malcing eve^
effort to avoid war in the Pacific.
For these reasons, Japan cannot
afford to miss her opportunity.
Never in history, was a State so
favored by fate as is Japan at
this hour.
These cables show how pressed the Gexman
1 A. efforts to bring about Japan'sAmbassador Ott to intensify the eiiorus vu ifs
attack. ^
- 52 -
vrifclJfc' ' l I • «
MA.
- - 'Wi
; M
Exhibit No* Doouinent No» ' • .
C 356 IJG-4662 This is a suggestion of V/EI2ta;\ECICER
IB 2.15-A subnittod to Ribbentrop, of Novembor 7>
^ iShA f T/ith •/TEIZSTiECICER'a typovnritten
signature^ copy sent to \i/DEEL4Al"3N»
iffilZa/iECKER informs Ribbentrop that
the Japanese government would like to
be assured that in case of a Japanese—
/ijEerican war Geimany would never
conclude a separate peace*
This shov/s. that '.yEIZa/iHGICER worked out all. eventualities
and took a persoi^ hand in details of the case*
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Exhibit No^
U09 NG-4420
Doc. B. 9-B
iicmorandum signed by Brann of
Novcraber 7^ 19Ad^ sabniittcd oO
•JEIZSaECICER and initialed by
hinij sent through Erdmannsdorff
and UOERi-j '^N and initialed by
both.
Braun reports that Usliiba, the
secretary of the Japanese Jhibassy^
had informed him that Aiiibassador
Oshima had conferred vdth Togo
by telephone on the previous day
and that Oshima had gotten the
impression that Japan intended
to adopt a firmer attitude.
Further^ Ushiba had inforiUGd
Br.?.un of the contents of a cabled
report from "Nomura in Jashington
commenting on the attitude in the
United >->tatos to\^ard the inter
national situation. It v;as Nomura's
guess that the united States v/as
not j''ct ready for •vvar and for that
reason v/as liioiting her contribu
tion to aid to England and Russia^
only to stpp in at the last momunt
and grab the glory of the victory.
The U.S. attitude toward Jap.yi
had stiffened and the econojiiic
blockade was receiving popular^
support but the danger of '»var in
the Pacific was not seriously
considered, liilitary circlosj on
the otiier harid, were reported to^
be not so optimistic and to realize
the war in the Pacific vjould place
the U.S. in a critic-al position.
"Horr Ushiba then stressed^
that this report from iash^g-
ton showed for the first _ti^e__
a reversal in appraisal of the
Ariierican situa.tion by jjiibassa-
dor Nomura, ^bassador Nomura
had up to now alwaj^s hold an
Ajaericrn entry into the war to
be imuiinont. The Ekibassy here
assuiiics tha,t the relatively
cautious reaction to the destroyer
sinkings in the United States
has brought about Noeuira's
changed appr^is '^"-!*"
This shows thr.t EIZS.4j5CKEH Piid l-fOSRiiiHH kept oonstwitljr
informed on the developments of their regressive war plans.
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Exhibit No. Docunont No.
AlO NG-A419r.
Doc. B. 9-B
410 NG-/4D-9b
Doc. B. 9-B
T'
lior.ior.'uiduiii vd.th typGvnrittcn
signr.turc of Erdnannsdo rff to
lEIiSAECKER, dated Novcnbcr lA,
1941^ taken fron VffilZS/UXICER' s
:ilesj rdth typoivrxtton signature
of Erdjnonnsdorff.
Erdjxannsdorff' s noniorandum states
that, according to instructions
from Rintolon, conveyed to him by
vJOERlivNN, ho has been assigned to
talcc over Stahmor's former function
of sounding out Ambassador Oshima.
WOERii'iNN had suggested that, in
order to legitif.iizo Erdmannsdorff' s
position, it v/ould be v-rclJ. for
IffllZS jilCKER to inforru the .imbassador
accordingly.
iicmoranduTA of T'/OERi/iid^N to iJElZS.-fiiCKER
and initialed by '•ffilZS/iECIUilR. Coj'y
to Erdmonnsdorff.
V/OERiiUJN' s memorandum conveying
Rintolon's instructions and advice
in the matter of ErdJ-iannsdorff' s
assignment from Ribbentrop to sound
out OshiJiia on the Kurusu matter.
Rintulen hod started that it vrould
bo a good idea for Erdmannsdorff
to conta.ct Oshima on his o;m when
ever such matters c?mc up. In
other vfords, •concludes \DERI'-u\NN,
he should take up Strinaer's former
role.
aihis shows |||rj.t \JEIZ!hiECICER and \JCEKiiU® kept constantly in-
fori'-icd on the developments of their aggressive war pirns.
411 NG-4423
Doc. B. 9-B
liemoranduni with typewritten signature
of Erdiiiannsdorff, to Foreign Ilinistcr,
dated NoveJiibor 17^ 1941, ivith copy
to '.fEIZS.'ECIfER, and initialed by
'fEIZS.uiiCKER; copy to I'^ERi'iiNN.
Erdraannsdorff reports tha-t, accor
ding to instructions, he discussed
vdth uho Ja.pancso ambassador the
possibility of a Japanese offensive
either towa.ilii the north or the south.
Oshirxa had comi-.i^ntod that he did not
have any infori.iation as to the inten
tions of his governr.ient and tha.t ho
could only stato his personal, opinion.
It was his guess that military opera
tions against Soviet Russia could
taico place only on a small sc.alo and
that any lorgo-scalo attack, on Vladi
vostok, for exar.iplc, v/ould have to bo
postponed until spring. Underlined by
• ffilZS.'iECKER.
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411 NG-4423 •
Doc. B. 9-B
,, •, . ,'w;.V. ,, ^
On the other hnnd, continued
Oshimr., the econoniic losses suffered
in the wnr "v/ith Chine, rxid the econonic
boycott of the :jiglo-Scxon-powers hnd
jaado sonc sort of offensive toward
the South iXiiperr.tivo because of the
urgent doiwrxid for crude oil. In reply
to ErdriPXinsdorff's inquiiy as to v-rhat
w^uld constitute such an offensive,
Oshiiua had ons^/orod that the nost
important objective wuld be the
island of Borneo. It vfas Oshinia.'s
opinion that the simplest alternative
ivould be to attack Borneo directly
but that the most effective ijethod
would be to attack Singapore, jji
attack on Borneo would, of course,
have to tal<c into consideration the
proxir,iity of the Philippines, however
it Liight bo possible to give
assurances that /jiicricrn possessions
Vfould not be ond.''ngered, while, of
course, being prepcared to tpjce action
against the Philippines, should the
U.S. attitude be such that it irould
bo necessary.
In reply to a further inquiry from
Erdj-.ia.rmsdorff, Oshima had cemented
that "the .nglo-Saxon powers mightjust barely condone a Japmosc mrch
into Thailand," which v/o.uld have to be
made after a preliminary arrengonient
vdth tlv.t government, -and vfliich vDuld
have the effect of creating a good
springboard for an attack on Singapore.
Should .'jaerican naval units n.ttoJiipt
intorforenco this v-iould only bo
to Japan's advantage since they v#ould
be operating far from their bases-.
In Oshima's opinion any decision as
to Japan's future policy would await ^
the result of the kurusu special mission,
This shows that rJETZaEClvER's and .10:^:.131^* s subordinate,
Erdninnnsdorff, worked rogulr.xly on the plrrming of this aggressive
war,.
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Ex hibit No,, Docuncnt No.
412 NG-4395
Doc. B. 9t-B
Tclogrrjii froa the Gonapji ^'jnbassc-
dor in Ronoj I.^mckonson, to the
Gcrr.inn Foreign Jilnistcr in Berlin,
dated Dcconbor 3^ 1941.
liackcnson reports about a confer
ence vdth the Itcalinn Foreign Hinister
Ciano. Cicano has reported to hia
about a conferonce bctv;ccn the Duce
and the Japanese /labassador. In this
confercncG the Japcancso iiabassador
had instructed the Ducc regarding
J.apaneso-.u.icricen relations. On this
occasion the Japanese inforaed the
Duco
"...that the outbreak of a con
flict bot^vQcn Japan and tho
United States, and thereby
also ^vith Great Britain, ought
now to be regarded as possible
and forthcoming in the imr.iediato
future."
Therefore, tho Japanese govern
ment had requested that tho Italien
declaration of v/ar should follow im
mediately, according to the terms of
tho Tripartite Pact. To this the Duce
had answered that
Italy v/ould do everything
in order to further militarily
the success of tho battle for
which Japcan prepares herself
now against the United States
and tho British Empire.
Tho cable from Geman .\mbassador liackcnson in Rone came as
a secret cable to for disposition, thus infoming
him in advance that his aims and efforts to bring about a Japa
nese attack on tho U.S. would have a successful outcome.
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Exhibit No, Docuiiiont No*
413 NG-4367
Doc. B, 9-B
Coble from ;j.ibossodor Ott, Tokyo to
Foreign Office Berlin, doted 5 DecOiTi-
bor 1941j token fron lTOERliU\lTP s files,
initialed V7. Copies sent to Bohle,
Koppler, Rittcr, Erdioannsdorff •
Ott reports that the Japanese Foreign
Ministry is considering v;ays of start
ing an "inevitable conflict" with the
United States. high official of the
Japanese Foreign Liinistry stated that
Japan bolievoi;.rticle 3 of the Tri
partite Pact was applicable in the
event of any conflict between one
of the signatory povrcrs and the Uni
ted States, except in case of an un
provoked attack on the ^jnerican con
tinent.
Italy has already been advised last
week that she should consider which
power shou3.d take over the protection
of her interests.
Ott continues that the Japcncso Foreign
I'ilnistry intends to nake the declaration
of war coincide \;ith the opening of
hostilities. He, in turn, advised them
to avoid a direct attack in order to
place the responsibility for the war
on the United States in accordance
with instructions received.
Ott requests further instructions in
viov; of the mounting tension.
This cable from Ott, vriiich as a secret cable came to VEIZSikCKiE
for disposition, shows that ho had advance knowledge of the impending
attack by the Japanese.
414 NG-2705
Doc. B. 9'B
Note from Doronborg's office submitted
to and initialed by •[ElZS-JilGI-ER, dated
6 Docoraber 1941j regarding tho crisis
in tho Far East.
;fEIZ3.i:CIiER is inforjaod that tho Chief
of ?rotoco3-. Minister von Docrnborg,
has suddenly left Berlin to inform
tho Hungarian Chief of State, Horthy,
that Ribbcntrop is unable to accept
his invitation to go hunting
"because of the crisis
in the Far East."
This note shovs that tho Foreign Office, including VJEIZS.JiX^IffiR,
was alerted on Docmiiber 6, 1941^ ^hd know tho.t tho crisis was about
to roach its z-^nith.
Exhibit No. Docuinont No.
A15 NG-4396 Telegram from .jabassador Ott in Tokyo
to the Foreign Office in Berlin^
Doc. B. 9"B dated Ducoriiber 8j distributed
in eighteen copies, among others, to
Ribbentrop, VffilZS.'JECICSR (initicoled
by TJEIZS.'JLCI^ER 'and taken from his
files), Erdmannsdorff.
Ott stresses the point that the
Japanese action was a surprise action.
The necessity of the surprise had al
ways been cjaphasized strenuously by
him and the German military attache.
This cable of Ott-, which is initialled by "'iEIZSi'iECKER, cbq^ressos
Ott's joy that Japanese military effohts had been successful "in
keeping exact time of attack secret and thereby preserving certain
factors of surprise. The importance of which for opening of war,
particularly in the air, v;as emphasized strenuously again by mo
and military attache."
416 NG-1424 Tclegrom from German /jiibassador Ott,
Tokyo, to Foreign Hinistcr of Dcccm-
Doc . B. 9-B ber 9, 1941, talcon f rom VJDEREiANN's
files end initialed by him. Copies
sent to Kcppler, Ritter^ Erdmannsdorff
and others.
Ott reports about his conference
vdth the Japanese Foreign Hinistcr.
In this conference the Japanese
Foreign I-dnister informed him
officially about the decision of
the Japanese govornnent to enter
the war against the U.S. and Britain.
"The Japanese government
expects that now Germany too
should declare right away war
against the United States.
bassador Oshima ha.d rcceivod sxnn*
lar instruction. The Foreign
i.unistcr a3-so dGcla.red that
Oshima had received the necess
ary instruction concerning the
agreement to conclude only byjoint action peace or armistice
"The Foreign Minister declared...
that it was hoped that through
the attack against Hcwaii the
:'U;ioricans would prevent it from
action in the Mostorn Pacific
Ooacai."
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This sccrot cp.blc, \vhich by virtuo of its secret clp.ssificn.tiorij
cniiic to rnd ur'.s also brought to ITOEIli.'.Jfl^Ps attention,
Ott informed the Foreign Office that ho, who had ;vorkcd so dili
gently according to Foreign Office instructions on persuading the
Japanese to enter the war — had told the Japanese Foreign I-iinistcr
"that I vias certain that the entire Gerraaji people ;jould accompany
the great and weighty decision of Japan -with their best vdshos..."
Ejdiijbit NOj^ 5,ocumcnt_No,_
A17 PS-2932
(US.>165)
Doc. B. 9-B
Hoiaoranduri on the reception of the
Japanese .'jabassador, General Oshiiaa,
by Hitler on Decer.ibcr 14, 1941 in
the presence of Ribbentrop,. Hand
written signaure of /if.ibassador Hov/cl,
liaison r.ian botv/een Ribbontrop and
Hitler.
The Fuehrer presented Oshiraa iidth
the Grand Cross of the Order of the
German Eagle in gold. This expression
of appreciation v/as prepared by
lieissnor as chief of the President
Chancolloiy. In cordial Tjords Hitler
paid tribute to Oshima for
"...his services in'the bringing
about of the German-Japanese co
operation •vThich has now been
crownod in a close brotherhood
in arms..."
"The Fuehrer continues;
'You gave the right docl;.ra-
tion of warj this method is
the real ono..."
"The Jap.anese GovernTiient ro^^lly
had "not done an^dhing frivolous,
ho (the Fuehrer) raust say that
the Japanese Government had shown
the patience of angels towards
that rowdy, Roosevelt... For
Germany the entrance of Japan
into the war meant a groat easing
of the situation. Ho must admit
openly that he (the Fuelirer) had
felt concornod about the pros
pects of success in the U-boat
war..."
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Ei^ibit Ko_. Docuncnt No.
417 NG-2932
.(USi-165)
cont'd.
Doc. B. 9-B
•) vv-
"Hoj tho Fuohror, uc.s con
vinced that Roosevelt raast bo
beaten. It had boon tho great
acconplishniont of the Japanese
that they have destroyed right
in the beginning the r.Tyth of
;jncrican sapcriority.. .How any
way wore troops to offer re
sistance to the end v/hcn their
god vias tho dollar?"
9. Conclusion
This document closes this brief on rEIZ3;jiClCijB's rnd VJOj-'PlI'liW' s
participation in promoting the aggression of Japan ag:'J.nst the U.S.,
Groat Britajji and tho Netherlands. Oshima, who had worked so closoJy
with vrEIZo/JiCiCiiR, vTOEffiON and Ribbentrop, on the comraon plan, was
decorated. The sa/uc Oshinm who for his participo.tion in this very
aggression has received a lifotiiee sentence at the Tokyo International
Military Tribunal. VJEIZS.J3CK:iR and WOERI'lU'JN, wo submit respectfully,
are responsible for participation in the same crime.
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This Supplomoutal Brief is "boing filod to call thQ attontlon
of the Tribunal to a fact ^ich ^posi-s to have "boon ox-orlookod in
the discussion of tho eo-callGd honorary menbci-ship in the SS" ,
In the princip®-! "brioi; reference is niRdG to va-rious decisions
indicating that in 1935 the position of honorary mnmhorship in. tho"
So was aoolished. The rocord is this case contains proof of the
fact that Pftor 23 January 1956, the honorary mQin"bership v/as abolished
by decree,
A representative letter fron? Hiimnler-s Office, addressed to tho
I
defendant DIETRIGH, indicates that all honorary members were
informed of the decree a"bolishJ-ng this title and that they were
informed of their appointment to other branches of tho SS. . Mejn'bors
so informed "by Himmler's office were required to send in their PS
identification cards for adniinistrP-ti"7Q handling.
Exhibit No„ 2574 (Boo. Ho.. HG-2657, Eoc, Bk. 94, Eng]., p. 165)
indicates the manner in v;hich tho honorary mombers of the SS were
informed of the fact that the title had been abolished by decree and
transferred to other offices (such p-s to the staff of Himraler) .
The exhibit is ac follov/st
"The "tioi chsfuchror SS Bor^-in, 25 February 1936
Forsonnel Office (staji^i) 26 February 1936
Journal Ho® W»/S.
To theSS-Jruppenfuehi-er Er. Otto EIETHICH
Bor:',in_W__8
V/iDiclmetr, 6
Ir acrc-aarce with the decree concerning the
reorganizat/..;n of the Fo-ohrer coips of the
EffOCtt.. - - ^ ^
GS-Fuehr9r in the Staf- H. co
Ycu PJ-e requeatad to send in the SS-identifi-
cation for rewriting to tho Personnel office of
EPSS, Berlin SW 11, Prini^-Alhrecht-Str. 9.
The Pe^rsonnel referent with the
Eei chsfuohrer SS
by order
(initial)
SS •«Ober s turmbannfuehror"
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